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Abstract
Working on powerlines is an inherently dangerous occupation. Powerline construction
and maintenance can be performed whilst the power line is energised or de-energised.
Although working with the powerline switched off is logically safer, a lineworker may
still be exposed to lethal electrical hazards with causes such as lightning, induction or
accidental energisation. Sadly, there are numerous examples where line workers have
been electrocuted working on de-energised powerlines.
The title of this project is “Prevention of electrical accidents with safe personal protec-
tive bonding and earthing”. Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing (PPBE) is a
safety technique employed by line workers to protect themselves against the the risk of
an electric shock. The technique aims to ensure the worksite is maintained at equipo-
tential conditions at all times. This is attempted by the installation of bonding cables
at or near the work area to ensure all conductive surfaces are electrically connected
together.
The project aim is to identify unsafe conditions that may exist for the application of
PPBE. If unsafe conditions are identified it may be possible to determine solutions
which will make working on powerlines safer.
The electrical principles which underpin the use of PPBE can be applied to all forms
of electrical work. However, the focus of this project is on high voltage distribution
powerlines.
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person’s chest. Ventricular fibrillation is the most common cause of death by electro-
cution. (IEEE 1048)
Electric shock- A sudden discharge of electricity through a part of the body (Oxford
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1048)
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Ground potential rise - also known as ‘earth potential rise’ - The maximum voltage
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Nomenclature xvii
Isolated - Physically separated, electrically and mechanically, from all sources of elec-
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breaker
Magnetic field induction (inductive coupling) - The process of generating volt-
ages and/or currents in a conductive objective or electric circuit by means of time
varying magnetic fields (IEEE 1048)
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USQ - University of Southern Queensland
WE - Working Earths
11kV - 11000 Volts
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction 2
1.1 Introduction
In the modern world, the use of electricity has become an integral part of peoples
life. Many of the activities that people undertake, or the products that people use,
would not be possible without a reliable and readily available electricity supply. The
electrical energy that consumers use is supplied via an established power network. The
power network comprises a system of generators, transmission and distribution lines,
and substations. The transmission and distribution lines which transport power from
the generation station to the consumer may be constructed overhead or underground.
Energy Network Operators (ENO) are the network businesses responsible for the oper-
ation and maintenance of these power networks. In order to maintain a safe and reliable
electricity supply, ENO must perform regular maintenance on their assets. ENO also
perform work to enhance their networks to cater for future development by constructing
new assets including powerlines and substations.
The construction and maintenance of powerlines requires the work of skilled trade
persons known as lineworkers. Powerline work is a specialised construction activity
where workers must be able to avoid the hazards of working with electricity. Powerlines
are operated at extremely high voltages. For example, typical distribution high voltage
lines operate at 11,000 or 22,000 Volts. Transmission lines operate at voltages as high
as 500,000 Volts. The worrying reality is that lineworkers cannot see the presence of
electricity or the imminent danger it poses. Contact with an energised high voltage
line can be lethal, and therefore, inadvertent contact is always a concern.
To keep their workers safe, and mitigate the hazards of electricity, ENO enforce strict
rules and procedures on how work must be done. Some companies use a document
known as the ’Electrical Safety Rules’ (or a similar name), to specify their requirements.
The rules provide a systematic approach to work designed to put in place protections
which keep the workers safe.
Powerline work can be undertaken under either energised or de-energised conditions.
Energised or ’live line’ work is performed when the social or economic costs of isolating
a powerline are too high. For example, de-energising the electricity supply to a central
business district can cause loss of trading for many businesses. This subsequently would
cause angst amongst the community and might damage the reputation of the ENO.
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Logically, working on a de-energised powerline is the safer option and is the preferred
approach where the impact of de-energising the network is not too great.
This research project focuses on a safety technique as known as Personal Protective
Bonding and Earthing (PPBE). The technique may also be referred to as ‘protective
grounding’ or ‘equipotential bonding and earthing’. PPBE is applied by lineworkers
when working on de-energised powerlines. Although a powerline might be turned off
and seemingly safe to access, the lineworkers must be protected against an unplanned
energisation of the line. Such an event could be lethal, and sadly there are many tragic
cases where workers have been fatally injured.
A powerline can be unintentionally energised by causes including voltage induction,
lightning strikes, accidental contact with other nearby lines, and network switching
errors. PPBE is to applied to the powerline so that in the event of an unplanned
energisation, equipotential conditions are maintained at the linesman’s worksite.
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2.1 What is Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing?
Broadly speaking, Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing (also known as ‘protec-
tive grounding’) is the practice of short circuiting and connecting to earth the electrical
conductors of a powerline. This procedure is undertaken by lineworkers prior to com-
mencing work on de-energised lines. PPBE is a safety measure aimed at mitigating the
risk of an electric shock caused by unplanned energisation of the powerline.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) states “the primary pur-
pose of protective grounding is to limit the voltage difference between any two accessible
points at the worksite to an acceptable value” (IEEE 1048) In other words the voltage
difference at any two points a worker might simultaneously touch must be small enough
that it does not cause a harmful electrical shock. An acceptable value will limit the
current through the human body to an amount that will not cause ventricular fibril-
lation of the heart (IEEE 80, p13). The effects of current upon the human body is
discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3.
Another explanation of PPBE is the provision of an alternative low resistance path for
fault current to flow and safely bypass the worker. The concept is that the majority of
fault current will take the path of least resistance through the earth cables and not the
worker. However, it is important to remember that if a worker forms a parallel path
with the fault current, then at least some current will flow through the worker. It is
the magnitude of this current which determines the risk to the worker.
Simply stated, the goal of protective grounding is to ensure is that equipotential con-
ditions are maintained at all times at the site of the lineworker.
2.2 Sources of electrical hazards
To appreciate the purpose and use of protective bonding, it is necessary to understand
the sources from which an electrical hazard might arise.
When a powerline is de-energised for work, it is isolated from its normal sources of
supply, or in other words simply ‘turned off’. This is usually achieved by opening a
circuit breaker and creating a visible isolation by then opening an air break switch or
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outdoor links. However, it is still possible that the line may be energised accidentally,
or subjected to induced voltages and currents caused by electric or magnetic induction
(IEEE 1048). Any of these circumstances are dangerous, and if not successfully miti-
gated, may cause a lethal hazard for a lineworker whether they be at the pole top or
standing on the ground. If this occurs, a worker may be subjected to step or touch
voltages, which if large enough could result in a serious electric shock.
Accidental energisation of a powerline can occur in a number of ways. Sometimes the
cause can be human error. For example, a line may be mistakenly turned on before a
linesman has completed work. Or, the lineworkers themselves can be at fault if they
cause an accidental contact between their de-energised line and a nearby live circuit.
This possibility is a particular hazard with powerlines supporting multiple circuits and
where only one circuit is isolated from supply. Vandalism has also been known to cause
an unintended energisation of powerlines, and an example of this is detailed in Section
2.6.3.
A direct strike on the line by lighting may result in a surge of fault current traveling
along the line. This current will quickly dissipate to earth but its path may include a
line worker in contact with the powerline. This is an extremely dangerous event given
the enormous amount of energy that lighting can generate.
Induced voltages and currents are a concern when a de-energised powerline is located
within close vicinity of other nearby powerlines which remain energised. The Australian
Standard “AS/NZS 4583:2012 - Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines” provides ex-
cellent information on magnetic induction (or low frequency induction), and the hazard
it creates. When a powerline is isolated, its electrical conductors can be compared to
the metallic pipelines described in this standard. That is, they are metallic objects
suspended in air and fully susceptible to the magnetic fields of nearby powerlines.
AS/NZS 4853:2012 explains “alternating current on a high voltage powerline can induce
a voltage on an adjacent pipeline. This induction results in a voltage over the exposure
length due to the electromagnetic field from the current. The induction is caused by
the alternating magnetic field intersecting the pipeline, causing the pipeline to act as
a secondary core of an air core transformer. The voltage is proportional to the length
exposed to the magnetic field”.
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The magnitude of the induced voltage is also influenced by other factors. This includes
the physical distance between the de-energised conductors of the isolated line, and each
phase conductor of the live powerline, as well as the magnitude and phase relationship
of the load currents of the energised line. The induction effects of a nearby powerline
with relatively balanced load currents will be relatively small as the “overall induced
voltage is the phasor sum of the voltage induced by each power line phase current”
(AS/NZS 4583). Thus, in a balanced load situation, the magnetic fields caused by
each phase effectively cancel each other out. However, the effects of induction can be
more severe when a nearby powerline which suffers a single phase to ground fault. This
results in a relatively larger flow of unbalanced fault current whose magnetic fields are
not canceled by current in the other phases.
AS/NZS 4853:2012 defines capacitive coupling as “the condition whereby the capac-
itance between the phase conductors or any metal object forms an electrical path to
earth”. The standard explains the electric field created by an energised powerline causes
the flow of a small continuous current to earth. When a de-energised line intercepts
the electric field, a portion of the current is distributed along its conductors which then
flows from the conductors to earth. The earth current can be by its own capacitance to
earth, or, by a direct electrical connection. Potentially this could be via a lineworker if
they form a circuit to earth.
If protective bonding is not employed to maintain equipotential conditions at the work-
site, lineworkers can be exposed to lethal voltages. A safety alert titled “Fatality of
Power Line Rigger” published on the Queensland Government Electrical Safety web-
site, outlines a tragic incident where a lineworker was electrocuted whilst constructing
a new line adjacent to an existing 275kV transmission line. Whilst the precise details
of the accident are not specified, the article indicates that voltage induction was the
cause (Dieckmann 2009).
2.3 Effect of current on the human body
Unfortunately, it is not possible to achieve absolute equipotential conditions at a work-
site. Under fault conditions, a worker will be exposed to some voltage and current even
if the amount is very small. When considering the potential hazards of de-energised
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work, and the application of PPBE, it is therefore important to have understanding of
the magnitude and duration of current a person can safely withstand.
AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 provides a thorough reference “on the effects of shock current on
human beings and livestock”. In fact, this standard was created for use in determining
electrical safety requirements. Other standards such as IEEE Std-1048 also include
literature on this subject due to its relevance in the safety context of those standards.
The danger of an electric shock to a person depends upon the magnitude and direction
of current. Current will flow through a person’s body from an entry point to an exit
point, or simply between the two conductive points of which a person is touching.
Applying Ohm’s Law, the magnitude is dependant upon the voltage difference between
these two points, and the Total Impedance of the Human Body (TIHB) for this given
path (e.g. hand to hand). The value of TIHB will vary between different individual
persons involved, the contact points on their body, and the environment in which a
person is working.
AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 provides a great deal of tabular data which illustrates how dif-
ferent conditions affect a persons resistance, and therefore, how much current will flow.
After inspecting the information, it can be seen that the TIHB is affected by the:
• current path through the body (eg. hand to hand, or hand to foot, or hand to
both feet)
• size of the ‘touch voltage’
• duration of the current flow
• frequency of current
• degree of moisture and salt content of the skin
• contact surface area at the entry and exit points of the body
• contact pressure exerted and temperature
Tables 1 to 9 of the AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 show experimental measurements of the
TIHB value when tested under the different conditions above. It can be seen that the
TIHB decreases with higher values of touch voltage, surface contact area, moisture and
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salt content. Thus under such conditions, higher current will flow and the severity of
the shock will be greater.
For a lineworker working on a warm day, it would be reasonable to expect they would
have a relatively low value of TIHB. They likely make good surface contact as they
grab a conductor, and would do so with moist and salt affected hands due to their per-
spiration. Therefore, the nature of their work will possibly make them more susceptible
to touch voltages than other people. Figure 1 indicates the total impedance of humans
could be in the range of 525 Ohms to 1050 Ohms for a touch voltage of 1000V.
Figure 2.1: Total Body impedances for a current path hand to hand A.C 50/60Hz, for large
surface areas of contact in saltwater-wet conditions. Source: AS/NZS 60479.1:2010
The seriousness of electric shock current to a person is dependant upon the magnitude
of shock current and its duration. The magnitude of current also affects a persons
ability to react and free themselves from their danger. AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 different
degrees of severity from the ‘threshold of perception’, to the ‘threshold of ventricular
fibrillation’. The threshold of perception is the the minimum amount of current flowing
though a persons body for them to be able to sense the shock. When ventricular
fibrillation occurs the hearts normal rhythm is disrupted and cardiac arrest can occur
which may lead to death. A safe level of current might be the ‘threshold of let-go’. At
this threshold, a person experiencing a shock still has enough muscular control to free
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themselves from the circuit.
Table 11 from AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 provides a summary of ‘time/current’ zones and
their physiological effects. (See Figure 2.2)
Figure 2.2: Time/current zones for a.c.15 Hz to 100 Hz for hand to feet pathway Source:
AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 - Table 11
Figure 20 from AS/NZS 60479.1:2010 provides an illustration of these zones.
Figure 2.3: Conventional time/current zones of effects of a.c.currents (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on
persons for a current path corresponding to left hand to feet. Source: AS/NZS 60479.1:2010
- Figure 20
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In Figure 2.3, it can be seen that ventricular fibrillation may occur with as little as
50mA of current. IEEE Std-1048 suggests a minimum of 67mA will cause fibrillation.
The actual amount will depend on the person and duration of the shock. However, when
compared with large fault currents which can be thousands of amps, either amounts
seem very minuscule indeed.
2.4 Selection of appropriate protective grounding equip-
ment.
The goal in applying protective grounding is to maintain equipotential conditions for
the line worker. If this is achieved, then the line worker will be safeguarded against the
possibilities of an electric shock. Careful consideration of the equipment used and how
it is installed is needed to ensure a safe work environment.
A one approach fits all approach will not necessarily work all the time. Failure to prop-
erly plan a project, recognise potential hazards at a site, or select the right equipment
may see the PPBE fail in its duty. To make matters worse, poor implementation of
PPBE can actually increase the risk of harm to lineworkers under fault conditions.
There are a number of standard guidelines available to network businesses and linework-
ers to enable them to make good PPBE selections. IEEE Std 1048-2003 “Guide for
Protective Grounding of Power Lines” is a thorough and specific reference on the topic
of protective grounding. The purpose of the document is “to provide guidance for pro-
tective grounding in job sites during de-energised maintenance of powerlines”. (IEEE
1048)
IEEE 1048 offers balanced advice, including assessment of the benefit and risks, on
specific scenarios requiring use of protective grounding. For example, in cases where
a structure contains both HV and LV de-energised conductors, the standard suggests
connecting the worksite earths to the LV neutral conductor. The benefit of this is an
assured low resistance connection to earth as the neural conductor is solidly grounded
at a nearby substation. However, IEEE 1048 also discusses risks which must be taken
into account by the work crew before deciding upon this approach. These include
the possible transferred earth potential caused by a ground fault through the portable
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earths to the LV conductors supplied from the substation. This could place other
workers simultaneously working on the LV mains at risk of severe touch voltages. A
suggested mitigation measure is the use of rubber insulation mats on the LV conductors
to safeguard against this event. This is but one example of many scenarios discussed
in the standard. The example is evidence of the importance of crews considering all
the risks before deciding the most appropriate application of PPBE.
IEC 61230 “Live working - Portable equipment for earthing and short circuiting” is a
standard which covers the actual equipment used for protective grounding. This is an
important standard as the design and component manufacture must be of high quality
if it is to be relied upon when subjected to a severe fault. The design of the portable
bonding and earthing equipment, including the components such as the clamps and
cables, as well as the equipment test procedures, are covered by this standard.
“EC 5 Guide to Protective Earthing” is a document with comprehensive information
on power system earthing. A solid understanding of earthing principles is imperative
in analyzing potential hazards associated with personal protective grounding. The
document is written for permanent earthing installations, but the information it con-
tains makes it a valuable resource for this research subject. The standard provides
much information on earthing design including solid explanations of soil resistivity and
electrode resistance.
“IEEE Std 80:2000 Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding” serves a similar
purpose to the EC 5 Guide to Protective Earthing and is an alternative reference for
earthing design.
Many network businesses have their own rules aimed at ensuring a safe approach
to working with electricity. One example is the Essential Energy policy document
CEOP8030 “Electrical Safety Rules”. This document’s purpose is to “provide a uni-
form set of safe work requirements which persons must comply with when involved with
work on or near electrical apparatus”. The document provides explicit instructions for
all types of electrical work on Essential Energy’s assets.
Essential Energy has another document CEOP2377 “Equipotential and Personal Pro-
tective Bonding” which supplements the safety rules, and provides specific instructions
for the application of personal protective bonds. In the case of overhead line work,
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the document offers five different methods in which protective bonding can be applied.
The choice of method depends on the type of pole and whether a permanent earth
is established at the pole. Figures 4 to 8 illustrate the different methods as per the
document.
Figure 2.4: Bond installed on timber pole with earthing and short circuiting in view of the
worksite. Source: EE2377
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Figure 2.5: Personal Protective Bonding using known permanent earth on a timber pole.
Source: EE2377
Figure 2.6: Personal Protective Bond using known permanent earth and Access Per-
mit/working earths on a timber pole. Source: EE2377
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Figure 2.7: Personal Protective Bond installed with Access Permit/ working earths on steel
or concrete structure. Source: EE2377
Figure 2.8: Steel or Concrete pole or structure with personal protective bond installed.
Source: EE2377
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2.5 What can go wrong with Personal Protective Bonding
and Earthing?
The correct implementation of PPBE can the difference between life and death for a
lineworker. However, if not applied correctly, it can actually increase the chance of
harm, not just for the workers, but also unsuspecting members of the public.
In his paper “Transferred Potential - A hidden killer of many linemen”, Suresh discusses
the dangers of Earth Potential Rise (EPR) to lineworkers in contact with de-energised
lines. Suresh examines the particular case of 3 wire distribution lines which don’t have
an overhead earth wire but are supplied from a star secondary transformer with a
solidly earthed neutral. Suresh criticizes the practice of earthing the de-energised line
at the source end as well as applying earths at the worksite. Instead he argues that a
safer outcome will be achieved by placing protective grounds and equipotential bonds
at the worksite only. Suresh demonstrates the danger caused by earthing at the source
end. He shows that voltage rise (i.e EPR) experienced on the substation earth grid
can be transferred along the powerline to the worksite. Suresh discusses a case where a
lineworker was fatally injured by this phenomenon. The worker was electrocuted when
a ground fault occurred on a separate energised feeder from the same substation, at
the same time work was taking place on a de-energised line.
The issue of earth potential rise is also discussed by Harrington although in a different
context. Harrington’s paper is focused on ’bracket earthing’, or the practice of applying
a set of earths one span either side of the worksite. Harrington quotes rules from many
utilities which highlight a philosophy to protect workers by having them “work between
grounds”. With a simple example, Harrington demonstrates how a worker may not be
protected at all by this approach and how they can be subjected to a severe touch
voltages. In his article he explains the voltages are proportional to the fault current
times the ground resistance and this can leave a line worker exposed to several kV.
Harrington says the solution to protective grounding is “to create by any practical
means an equipotential zone for the man to work in”.
The principles behind the findings of Harrington and Suresh provide much food for
thought for many worksite scenario’s a lineworker might encounter. For example, if a
fault occurs and worksite earths are installed close to the pole, then hazardous step
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potentials may form on the ground where an assistant linesman might be standing. On
the other hand, if the worksite earths are applied a significant distance from the pole,
the linesman aloft on the pole might be subject to very high touch voltages. There are
two important questions about this. Firstly, is there is an location to apply the earths,
and how can this be determined? Secondly, do present day line workers understand
these issues and can they consider these risks before starting the job?
Zipse discusses another hazard in the form of ‘stray current’. He defines stray current as
current that enters the earth and flows uncontrolled back to its source. Unlike current
flowing though cables, once current enters the earth, we lose the ability to control where
it goes. As electric current will choose the path of least resistance, it will sometimes
flow through areas which create hazards for humans or animals. This could include,
for example, swimming pools, and buried metallic pipelines. In his paper “Death by
Grounding”, Zipse explains how the use of multi-grounded neutral systems exacerbate
this problem. By providing multiple entry points to the earth, we allow the current
to flow uncontrolled and through nearby objects on its way back to its source. In his
paper, Zipse emphasises the problem by referring to real electrocution cases including
fatalities in swimming pools, and cows killed by the stray current from underground
bare concentric neutral cables.
A sad case in Australia also shows the significance of the hazard posed by stray current.
In 2005, a Sydney Water employee was electrocuted when repairing a broken water pipe
in Sydney’s West (SMH 2005). The cause of the accident was stray current caused by a
faulty earth or neutral system either on the premises or somewhere nearby. (Workcover
NSW). A report published following this incident by Werda et al offers excellent insight
into how faulty electrical neutral or earth systems can cause stray current to flow
through water pipes and other places it is not expected. It is easy to understand how
the danger experienced by the plumber can also affect a lineworker in both overhead
and underground line work. The frightening aspects of scary aspect of stray current
is that it cannot be seen, nor simply controlled by turning off the main switch of
an installation. Current may still flow uninhibited from a faulty installation on the
property next door, or further somewhere further beyond.
The significance of Zipse and Werda et al’s reports is that stray current will flow through
de-energised lines unexpectedly, and therefore, pose a lethal risk to lineworkers. Once
a power line has earths applied, it may then provide a low resistance path for stray
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current to travel its source. A very dangerous example would be the result of an earth
fault on a nearby powerline which may cause a current of hundreds of Amps to flow
through the earth. Some of this might flow back into the de-energised line creating a
sever risk of electric shock. Lineworkers must be mindful of this risk when planning
how they manage their use of equipotential bonding and earthing.
2.5.1 Potential safety problem with bonding method shown in Figures
2.6 and 2.7
There have been doubts raised about the safety of the bonding method shown in Figures
2.6 and 2.7.
If the overhead line becomes energised unintentionally, fault current will flow from the
overhead conductors through the portable earths to the ground. However, as can be
seen in both figures, the line worker is forming a parallel path through which fault
current can also flow to ground. Whilst it is often stated that current will follow the
path of least resistance, in a parallel circuit there will always be some current flowing
in each branch.
It is expected that the low resistance of the portable earths would cause current to
flow through the equipment and down to earth via both connections at the pole and
temporary earth stake. However, it is conceivable that the voltage at the connection
on the pole could be greater than the voltage at the earth stake due to the resistance
ratios of the pole. If so, this would cause current to flow from the pole towards the
earth stake rather than the other way round. Any current flowing in this direction
would have to flow from the conductors and through the linesman.
Should this occur the lineworker may be subject to a far more significant, and possibly
lethal, shock than anyone would have expected. A thorough analysis of this bonding
method is required to determine if there is a lethal flaw with this PPBE method.
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2.6 Case studies
2.6.1 Introduction
The following case studies are real examples which highlight the dangers that linework-
ers are sometimes exposed to. Cases 1 and 2 demonstrate the value of PPBE in achiev-
ing a safe outcome. In Case 3, it is possible that a fatality may have been avoided had
proper PPPE was established at the site prior to the operation of the air break switch.
2.6.2 Case study - Lightning discharge incident
Incident details
In December 2013, three overhead line crews were working on an 11kV rural distribution
feeder in the Glen Innes region of New South Wales. The work was required for pole
replacements and other unspecified maintenance. The powerline the crews worked on
was de-energised by opening, locking and tagging an Air Break Switch(ABS). After the
line was proven de-energised, a set of Access Permit (AP) earths were established one
span downstream of the isolation point (i.e ABS). (EEWI 2013)
At approximately 12.30pm, the crew coordinator and an apprentice arrived at a pole
which was due to be replaced. As the access permit earths were remote and out of site,
in accordance with their Electrical Safety Rules, they applied a set of worksite earths
on the southern side of the pole and a set of equipotential bonds on the other side. The
bonds were applied in a similar fashion to the arrangement shown in Figure 6. The old
pole was removed and the new pole was sited in position ready for its foundation to be
backfilled and rammed. (EEWI 2013)
Around this time, the crew coordinator observed a storm approaching from the west
and stopped work to allow it to safely pass. Whilst waiting for the storm to clear, the
crew coordinator received a call from the local network operator. He was told that
there were high voltage fuses blown about three km’s west of the work location. It is a
common occurrence for high voltage fuses to blow during storms as a result of lighting
causing surges on the powerline. The crew coordinator waited a further ten minutes
until he was satisfied that the storm had safely passed. At this point he decided to
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ascend the pole so they could complete the work. This involved tying the conductors
to the insulators on the new pole. (EEWI 2013)
Whilst tying off the conductors, the crew coordinator heard and saw an arc from the
worksite earth where it was clamped to the overhead conductor. The crew coordinator
did not receive a shock but was frightened by the arcing. The apprentice on the ground
also saw and heard the arc. The crew coordinator sat back in his harness and analyzed
in his mind what had happened. He concluded that the arc was caused from induction
due to lightning. Sometime later, he finished tying off the conductors, descended the
pole, removed the worksite earths and moved on to the next job location. (EEWI 2013)
At the end of the day, the crew coordinator reported the incident to his supervisor.
Outcome
The supervisor insisted the crew coordinator attend hospital for a medical assessment.
An ECG and physical examination was made, and the crew coordinator was cleared
with out any signs of illness or injury. The apprentice who was on the ground at the
time did not suffer any injuries either. (EEWI 2013)
A worksite investigation was launched to determine the cause of the incident. At this
point in time, the investigation into the incident is not yet complete. The preliminary
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findings from the investigation are:
• Data obtained from the Bureau of Meterology confirmed that lightning was
recorded in the area at approximately the same time the incident occurred.
• The worksite earths, and equipotential bonds were installed in accordance with
recommended procedures.
• On the balance of probabilities, the arcing was caused by a lightning discharge
on the powerline.
Comments
This incident is a positive example of PPBE doing its job and keeping the workers safe.
With the benefit of hindsight, the best outcome would have been for the workers to
have waited longer before resuming work. The preliminary report does not state what
other forms of personal protection the line workers were wearing (eg. gloves) but this
may have also been of benefit in this case.
There are, however, several questions that arise from this incident had the circum-
stances been different. For instance, had a permanent earth been available on the pole,
and the worksite earths applied in the configuration shown in Figure 6, would the crew
coordinator still have been safe?
2.6.3 Case study - Energisation caused by vandalism
Incident details
In May 2001, a line crew was working aloft from an Elevated Work Platform (EWP)
on a de-energised 11kV line. Their task was to replace a faulty crossarm at an existing
pole in an urban area. The 11kV line was isolated by opening ABSs on either side of
the worksite, access permit conditions were established, and the crew installed two set
of worksite earths on either side of the pole (ESAA 2001). This application of worksite
earths is known as ‘bracket earthing’.
Whilst removing the last high voltage conductor from the old crossarm, the crew mem-
bers noticed arcing on the line from one of the worksite earths. The crew immediately
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stopped work and moved their work platform clear of the line. It was later confirmed
there was a successful ’trip and reclose’ on an 11kV feeder connected to one of ABSs
which isolated supply to the site (ESAA 2001).
An inspection was made of all the isolation points to determine the cause of the trip
and reclose. A piece of fencing wire was found hanging from one ABS and later upon
closer inspection, burn marks were visible on one phase of the switch. Another piece of
fencing wire was found hanging on a fence adjacent to the pole which supported this
ABS. The investigation team concluded that the fencing wire was too long and heavy
to have been carried by birds, and therefore, vandalism was the cause. Consequently
the police were notified of the incident (ESAA 2001).
Outcome
No one was injured in the incident although the crew member who was holding the
wire was sent to hospital as a precaution (ESAA 2001).
The unintended energisation of the site caused an ‘intermix’ between the 11kV circuit
and LV mains which reside below them on the pole. An intermix is when the high
voltage circuit makes direct contact with the low voltage circuit and causes a large
over-voltage in the LV circuit. Exactly how this occurred is not stated in the incident
report. However, some domestic switchboards and appliances were damaged as a result.
Comments
It is apparent that this incident was the direct result of vandalism. The incident report
does not make any suggestion of fault on the part of the work crew, or provide any
indication of poor weather. This event emphasizes that danger is always present despite
proper planning and responsible actions of the work crews. The line crew was exposed
to a lethal risk of electric shock in a manner of which they had no control. The use of
protective grounding was proved vital in the safe outcome for the workers.
Considering the reported intermix, it can be surmised that the worksite earths were
connected to the neutral conductor of the LV system. This is a valid method of obtain-
ing an earth connection in accordance with IEEE 1048 (2003). However, this method
is not without danger. The damage caused to domestic switchboards and appliances is
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evidence that dangerous voltages were impressed upon the connected consumer instal-
lations. Potentially, this decision has endangered the lives of unsuspecting members of
the community (IEEE 1048 2003).
A cause for concern is whether lineworkers are actually considering the pros and cons
of different earthing methods? Are they equipped with enough expertise to make the
safest choices, or do they simply rely on the same approach for all job sites? A failure to
properly assess the risks is a root cause of an accident. Work supervisors, lineworkers,
and network operators need to ensure they consider each site on its merits.
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2.6.4 Case study - Worker electrocuted operating Air Break Switch
Incident details
An electrical fitter/mechanic employed by the South East Queensland Electricity Board
(SEQEB) received a fatal electric shock whilst operating a pole mounted ABS (Bevan
2005).
Earlier a fault had occurred in the network when a 33kV crossarm failed and the 33kV
conductors dropped into an 11kV circuit below them. The over voltage caused by the
intermix of 33kV and 11kV caused an 11kV surge arrestor to fail. This resulted in the
surge arrestor forming a permanent short circuit from the 11kV mains to earth via a
steel surge arrestor cable saddled down the outside of the same pole as the ABS. The
metal operating handle of the switch, which was mounted at ground level, was earthed
by a connecting cable to the surge arrestor downlead (Bevan 2005).
After the 33kV fault had been identified and dealt with, the fault caused by the surge
arrestor was still present on the 11kV circuit, and this caused the protection devices
to trip. At this stage, staff were unaware of what was causing the fault or its location,
so they were switching sections of line on and off to test and isolate the faulty line
section. When the SEQEB employee closed the switch, he unknowingly connected the
faulty surge arrestor to the 11kV which energised everything connected to it 6.35kV
(phase voltage of the 11kV system). Therefore, the surge arrestor downlead and metal
operating switch handle were also energised and the worker formed part of the fault
current circuit to earth (Bevan 2005).
Outcome
The SEQEB worker who was only 24 years old, was electrocuted and died instantly
(Bevan 2005).
Comments
This tragedy demonstrates the dangers on not maintaining equipotential conditions
as a work site. The provision of an ‘equipotential mat’ at the ABS site may have
prevented the worker’s death when he closed the switch. The use of insulated gloves
when switching may also have saved the life of the SEQEB employee. It is not clear
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whether it was a requirement at the time of this incident. However, is now a mandatory
requirement of many ENO’s that insulated gloves must be warn when switching.
2.6.5 Case study: Fatality cause by voltage induction
Incident details
In December 2009, a power construction crew were working on the construction of a
new 275kV transmission line. As construction of the line was not complete, the work
would be undertaken under de-energised conditions. The project was located near the
town of Kelso in North Queensland.
The task for the day was the installation of spacers between phase conductors of the
new transmission line. Due to the height of conductors being approximately 30m, a
suspended mobile trolley was to be used to install spacers at the required locations. An
elevated work platform would be used to lift the trolley and the workers into position.
The work contained significant safety risks including working from heights and voltage
induction from adjacent powerlines. At the worksite, an energised 275kV transmission
line resided just 15m away. Risk management procedures adopted by the company
included the preparation of an Activity Method Statement (AMS), a work permit for
working at height activity, a Task Risk Assessment, and a mandatory pre-start safety
meeting.
The AMS was prepared two days prior to the work and accepted and signed by all
members of the work crew. Therefore, it would reasonable to assume the risks involved
with the work would be understood by all team members. The permit for working at
heights was obtained the day before the work. Work procedures document in the AMS
mandated that the line conductors be earthed via the adjacent towers. The document
specified the use of insulated gloves and line stick for the purpose of applying these
earths.
On the day of the planned work, work commenced but a number of safety requirements
were totally disregarded. The mandatory pre-start discussion was not held and some
vital tools and safety equipment was not available at the site. The crew supervisor
instructed his colleague to attach the earth cable to the EWP rather than the towers
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as they lacked the proper attachment clamp. Also, the insulated line stick which was
needed to safely apply the earths was also not available.
Instead of stopping work to address the safety problems, the crew supervisor elected
to push ahead. The supervisor attempted to attach the earth clamp to the overhead
conductors using his hands. At the time he was doing so, he was wearing one insulated
glove and one riggers glove which does not provide adequate insulation.
Outcome
The crew supervisor who was in the work trolley received a fatal electric shock. The co-
worker, who was in the EWP, also received 4 separate shocks. The co-worker survived
but unfortunately sustained severe injuries. The electric discharge which harmed the
workers was caused by voltage induction from the adjacent energised transmission line.
The primary cause of the accident was attributed to a failure to properly earth the line
in accordance with the AMS procedures.
Comments
This tragic incident highlights some key issues relating to workers safety on de-energised
powerlines.
It is unquestioned that had the workers followed the documented procedures of the
AMS, the incident would not have occurred. The workers involved would have been
protected and remained safe. It is therefore the tragic result of this incident which
highlights the importance of Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing. The incident
also demonstrates why planned mandatory control measures are so important to ensure
a safe work outcome.
The incident also demonstrates how humans from time to time make poor decisions
which can have tragic consequences. What is known is that the crew supervisor, a 29
year old engineer, had considerable experience and was well aware of the risks caused
by induction. What is not certain is why he elected to ignore safety procedures and
proceed with the project.
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3.1 Research Methodology
3.1.1 Aim of the research
Power companies place an enormous emphasis on the safety of their workforce. Strict
procedures exist for construction activities on powerlines. In an ideal world, a well
planned project will ensure that all risks for the line worker are mitigated, and the
project proceeds safely and without incident. However, as the case studies in Section
2.6 show, situations occur from time to time where lines are energised unexpectedly
and lineworkers are placed at risk. In these cases, PPBE provides a vital last line of
defence for the lineworker, and its effective performance is crucial to the final outcome
from an incident.
The overall aim of my research is to achieve two important outcomes. Firstly, to accu-
rately examine current PPBE techniques and identify any potential shortcomings which
may exist. Should problems be found then potential solutions will be recommended.
Secondly, to increase awareness and emphasise the dangers of working on de-energised
lines. It is hoped that my findings will serve to reduce complacency that may exist
amongst current line workers. if these two objectives are met, then my findings will be
of benefit in reducing serious accidents in the future.
3.1.2 The process for research
A real high voltage 11kV distribution feeder was selected for analysis to examine the
likely performance of PPBE at several locations along its route. The selection of a
real powerline ensures the parameters used in the analysis are realistic real world val-
ues. This ensures the results have greater credibility than a project based on purely
hypothetical information.
A further benefit of using real world information is the multitude of scenarios that
can be envisaged when visiting several sites. There are a number of factors that will
influence the performance of PPBE, a few of which include the fault level, number of
isolation points, their proximity to the worksite, pole conductivity and size, and site
soil resistivity. Conducting several site surveys assisted in developing a broad range of
scenarios, which in turn meant a more thorough analysis.
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The research approach is outlined in the following 4 steps.
Step 1
The first step was the collection of site data and network information. In total five sites
along the feeder were selected for the project. At each site, information was collected
for later use in the project analysis. The typical information obtained at each site
included:
• Pole details including material, height, and pole top configuration.
• Details of the permanent earth (if existing) including the conductor size and
noting if the conductor was bare or insulated.
• Earth resistivity test including a note on the level of moisture in the soil (eg. dry
or recent rain).
• Alternative options for earthing of PPBE equipment (eg. LV neutral conductor)?
• Presence and location of underground services such copper phone lines or metallic
water pipes
• Note of the likelihood of work site being frequented by members of the public
Step 2
To conduct an electrical analysis of PPBE performance, information about the local
11kV distribution network was required. For example, to determine the maximum
fault levels at a site under analysis, information to calculate the upstream network
impedance must first be obtained. The information required was obtained from Essen-
tial Energy’s substation records, Graphical Information System (GIS), original power-
line survey plans, and by field inspections to verify the data.
A factor which may significantly influence the outcomes of the research the selection
of electrical resistance values for timber, steel and concrete power poles. Detailed
information is included in Section 3.2.4.
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Step 3
Determine the PPBE technique which would be applied at each site. The study area is
located within the jurisdiction of Essential Energy, the local network service provider.
As such, the application of PPBE is influenced by the requirements within Essen-
tial Energy documents CEOP2377 (Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing) and
CEOP8030 (Electrical Safety Rules). Factors affecting the selection of PPBE include
the type of pole, the availability of a permanent earth, the proximity of the upstream
electrical isolation point(s), and whether or not the isolation point(s) is within view of
the work site.
Step 4
Provide a thorough electrical analysis of the PPBE system at the work site. The goal is
to predict whether the PPBE would adequately protect the line workers in the event of
an unexpected energisation. The PPBE performance is determined as part of an overall
system of protection provided by the electrical isolation points, and the provision of
access permit earths at those points.
The electrical analysis includes the following steps:
• An appraisal of all possible electrical risks at each site (e.g. accidental energisa-
tion, transferred potential).
• Preparation of appropriate electrical connection diagrams, and sequence diagrams
for analysis purposes.
• Determination of the maximum prospective fault current that may flow through
the work site.
• Determine the possible step and touch voltages and currents a line worker may
be exposed to, and whether these outcomes are within safe limits.
• Earth surface voltage analysis to examine step potential or transferred potential
risks at the locality.
• Analysis of alternative PPBE application options to identify if an improved level
of safety can be achieved.
• Document results and make recommendations based on the key findings.
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3.2 Analysis and results
3.2.1 Details of 11kV feeder to be used for analysis
An 11kV distribution feeder located in the Queanbeyan region of NSW was used for
analysis in this project. The feeder selected is known as the “Southbar Road 11kV
feeder” (Feeder). The Southbar Road feeder commences at the South Queanbeyan
Zone substation in an urban area of Queanbeyan, before leaving the city and supplying
customers in the rural surrounds. As such, this feeder provided a useful cross section of
work sites from both urban and rural locations. A locality diagram for the substation
and Southbar Road feeder is shown in Figure 3.1.
The South Queanbeyan Zone Substation (Zone Substation) is one of two substations
that supply power to the city of Queanbeyan. The Zone substation is supplied via two
66kV overhead sub-transmission lines originating at the Transgrid 132kV/66kV Oaks
Estate substation located to the north of the city. The Zone Substation has two main
66kV/11kV Dy1 power transformers both rated at 20/25/30MVA.
Under normal operating conditions, the 66kV bus is energised by both 66kV feed-
ers connected in parallel. A 66kV bus bar isolator is kept ‘normally open’ which in
turn leaves one transformer in service whilst the other is de-energised but available on
standby. An automatic changeover system is available should there be a fault with the
in service transformer or incoming 66kV supply. It is possible for the two transformers
to operate in parallel, however, it would require an unusual circumstance for this to
occur.
The Zone Substation has 10 outgoing 11kV feeders to supply Queanbeyan and the
surrounding area. Some of these feeders can be paralleled with feeders from other zone
substations to allow back feeding when required. The Southbar Road feeder can be can
connected to the Googong Zone Substation located to the south of Queanbeyan via the
Michelago 11kV feeder from that substation.
The No.1 and No.2 main transformers are of identical make with impedances of 10.21%
and 10.11% respectively. The transformer ratings are 20MVA , 25MVA and 30MVA
depending upon the operation of cooling fans and oil pumps.
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Figure 3.1: South Queanbeyan Zone Substation locality
A single line schematic diagram of the Southbar Road 11kV feeder is shown in Figure
3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Southbar Road 11kV Feeder Network Diagam
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3.2.2 Information required in project analysis
Source impedance values
To accurately calculate prospective fault levels at each site, it was necessary to con-
sider the impedance of the upstream 66kV network. To determine values of source
impedance, fault current levels at the Zone Substation 66kV bus were obtained from
Essential Energy’s protection engineers. The fault level information has been obtained
for two possible scenarios. The first is the 66kV bus is in its ‘normal’ configuration
whereby the 66kV bus bar isolator is open, and the supply to the substation is via one
of two 66kV feeders. The second is with the 66kV bus tie closed and the substation
supplied by the two 66kV feeders operating in parallel. The fault current levels at the
66kV bus are shown Table 3.1 below.
Fault description Normal Configuration Maximum Configuration
Three phase fault 4.51kA 5.15kA
SLG fault 4.10kA 5.15kA
Table 3.1: Queanbeyan South Zone Substation fault levels at 66kV Bus
The presence of access permit or work site earths on a powerline which is re-energised
create a fault situation on this line. The analysis of the fault current flowing from such
a fault is made easiest by the use of symmetrical sequence components.
Using the known fault level information, for the 66kV source, the positive sequence
impedance Z+ of the source can be determined by the equation:
X+source =
Van
Ifault3ph
(3.1)
Given the Zone Substation is electrically a long way from the system power generators,
it is assumed the negative sequence impedance of the source is not influenced by the
effect of rotating machinery. Therefore Z− is equal to Z+.
A Single Line to Ground (SLG) fault is the type of fault which will cause the most
current to flow to earth. It is this type of fault which provides the greatest hazard to
the safety of the line workers. As such, the SLG fault is a key focus of the project
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research. When the SLG fault is analysed using symmetrical components, the positive,
negative and zero sequence networks are connected in series. It can therefore be shown
be shown that the SLG fault level is be determined from the Equation 4.19:
IfaultSLG =
3Van
X+ +X− +X0 + 3Rf
(3.2)
With transposition, this equation becomes:
X0source =
3Van
IfaultSLG
−X+ +X− − 3Rf (3.3)
When determining the zero sequence impedance value X0, the fault resistance should
not be considered and therefore, the term 3Rf cancels from Equation 3.3.
Essential Energy’s engineers also advised that a the Zone Substation earth grid resis-
tance value was measured at 0.3 Ω a few years ago.
Using the above fault level information, the source impedance values are calculated
using Equations 3.1 and 3.3 below.
X+source =
1√
3
× 66000V
4.51kA
= 8.449 Ω (3.4)
X−source = Z
+
source = 8.449 Ω (3.5)
X0source =
1√
3
× 66000V
4.10 kA
− 8.449 Ω− 8.449 Ω = 10.984 Ω (3.6)
To use these values to determine fault levels in the 11kV system, it is necessary to
convert the impedances to per unit values.
Using a 25MVA base, the base current is found:
Ibase66 =
25MVA√
3× 66kV = 218.7A (3.7)
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The base impedance is found:
Zbase66 =
66000V√
3× Ibase66
= 174.7 Ω (3.8)
The 66kV source per unit values are determined by dividing the results of Equations
3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 by Zbase66. Thus,
X+sourcepu = j0.038634 pu (3.9)
X−sourcepu = j0.038634 pu (3.10)
X0sourcepu = j0.050224 pu (3.11)
Transformer impedance values
To determine the available fault levels at the 11kV bus, the impedance of the zone
substation transformers must also be considered. Whilst the two transformers are of
identical make and rating, the No.1 transformer has an impedance of 10.21% and the
No.2 transformer an impedance of 10.11%. The Southbar Road Feeder can be supplied
by either transformer depending upon which one is left in service. The impedance
percentages are converted to a per unit value by simply dividing by 100, thus giving
XTxpu = 0.1021 pu and XTxpu = 0.1011 pu respectively. The fault level will be slightly
higher when the No.2 transformer is in service.
Line impedance
Conductor and cable information for the Southbar Road 11kV feeder has been obtained
from Essential Energy’s Geographic Information System (GIS) and historical construc-
tion plans. The information was verified during field visits to obtain information to
be used in the project analysis. A summary of the cable and conductor information is
shown in the Table 3.2 below.
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Section From To Cable and Conductor type Distance (m) Notes
(m)
1 Zone sub CE19301 3c 240mm PASS Alum 35
2 CE19301 CE19313 Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 612
2A CE19313 CE19265 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 20
3 CE19313 CE19297 Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 15
3A CE19297 CE19ZZZ Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 29 33-A2337
4 CE19XXX CE19099 Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 112
5 CE19099 CE19317 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 260 Site 1
6 CE19317 CE19319 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 345
7 CE19319 P12553 3c 240mm sq Al UG cable 72
8 P12553 CE6152 3c 240mm sq Al UG cable 348
9 CE6152 CE19320 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 122 Site 2
10 CE19320 CE19325 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 660
11 CE19325 CE69894 Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 162
12 CE69894 CE69899 Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 511 Site 3
13 CE69899 CE138673 Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 1174
14 CE138673 CE138710 Neon (19/3.75 AAAC) 1837 33-R3452
15 CE138710 CE138712 Neon (19/3.75 AAAC) 211 33-R3406
16 CE138712 CE138870 Neon (19/3.75 AAAC) 3936 L913
17 CE138870 CE139310 Hydrogen (7/4.50 AAAC) 2146 L2937
18 CE139310 CE139362 Neon (7/4.50 AAAC) 1534 Site 4
Table 3.2: Southbar Road 11kV feeder cable and conductor details
A single line diagram of the feeder showing relevant conductor sections, isolation points,
and the work sites to be analysed, is shown in Figure 3.2. The diagram can be used to
correlate the section information in Table 3.2.
The values of impedance used in calculations have been obtained from sources including
conductor and cable catalogues, and Essential Energy’s Overhead Design Manual. The
per unit impedance information is summarised in Table 3.3.
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Cable or Conductor Z Positive Z Negative Z Zero
(Ω/km) (Ω/km) (Ω/km)
3c 240mm PASS Alum 0.162 +j0.095 0.162 +j0.095 0.74 +j0.047
Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR) 0.167 + j0.228 0.167 + j0.228 0.167 + j0.684
Mercury (7/4.50 AAC) 0.315 + j0.259 0.315 + j0.259 0.315 + j0.777
UG cable 3c 240mm sq Al 0.162 +j0.095 0.162 +j0.095 0.74 +j0.047
Neon (19/3.75 AAAC) 0.173 + j0.235 0.173 + j0.235 0.173 + j0.705
Hydrogen (7/4.50 AAAC) 0.323 +j0.259 0.323 + j0.259 0.323 + j0.777
Table 3.3: Overhead conductor and underground cable impedance values
To calculate the prospective fault currents at each work site, the cable and conductor
information must first be converted to per unit values. To simplify this process a script
was developed in Matlab. The Matlab script imports the data from a Microsoft Excel
file, and then multiplies the data by the line section distances. Finally, the Ohmic
impedance information have been converted to per unit values by dividing by the 11kV
base impedance.
The value of the 11kV base impedance is found as follows:
Ibase11 =
25MVA√
3× 11kV = 1312.2A (3.12)
Zbase11 =
11000V√
3× Ibase11
= 4.84 Ω (3.13)
A summary of the per unit section impedance values is shown in Table 3.4 below.
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Section Positive sequence Z Negative sequence Z Zero sequence Z
(pu) (pu) (pu)
1 0.0012 + j0.0007 0.0012 + j0.0007 0.0054 + j0.0003
2 0.0211 + j0.0288 0.0211 + j0.0288 0.0211 + j0.0865
2A 0.0013 + j0.0011 0.0013 + j0.0011 0.0013 + j0.0032
3 0.0045 + j0.0061 0.0045 + j0.0061 0.0045 + j0.0184
3A 0.0019 + j0.0016 0.0019 + j0.0016 0.0019 + j0.0047
4 0.0158 + j0.0130 0.0158 + j0.0130 0.0158 + j0.0389
5 0.0225 + j0.0185 0.0225 + j0.0185 0.0225 + j0.0555
6 0.0024 + j0.0014 0.0024 + j0.0014 0.0110 + j0.0007
7 0.0116 + j0.0068 0.0116 + j0.0068 0.0532 + j0.0034
8 0.0079 + j0.0065 0.0079 + j0.0065 0.0079 + j0.0196
9 0.0430 + j0.0353 0.0430 + j0.0353 0.0430 + j0.1060
10 0.0105 + j0.0087 0.0105 + j0.0087 0.0105 + j0.0260
11 0.0176 + j0.0241 0.0176 + j0.0241 0.0176 + j0.0722
12 0.0405 + j0.0553 0.0405 + j0.0553 0.0405 + j0.1659
13 0.0657 + j0.0892 0.0657 + j0.0892 0.0657 + j0.2676
14 0.0075 + j0.0102 0.0075 + j0.0102 0.0075 + j0.0307
15 0.1407 + j0.1911 0.1407 + j0.1911 0.1407 + j0.5733
16 0.1432 + j0.1148 0.1432 + j0.1148 0.1432 + j0.3445
17 0.1024 + j0.0821 0.1024 + j0.0821 0.1024 + j0.2463
Table 3.4: Southbar Road 11kV feeder section impedances in per unit
3.2.3 Type of fault for analysis
Prior to working on a line, the powerline is isolated, proven de-energised, and then
short circuiting and earthing is applied. When APE or WE earths are applied, all three
phases of the line are securely bonded together and then bridged to earth. Should the
line be re-energised by an accidental three phase switching, the short circuiting of the
line presents a balanced three phase fault. In this situation, practically all the fault
current flows back to its source via the phase conductors of the powerline, and there is
no significant amount of current flowing to earth.
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The most dangerous type of fault for a work site is the single line to ground fault. In
this case, all the fault current flows via the powerline to the worksite, and then returns
to the source via the earth. This can occur if only one of the phases in the powerline is
energised. This could possibly occur in a number of ways. For example, if the powerline
was mistakenly energised using single phase switching (with links or fuses), or is there is
contact made with another nearby circuit either by accident, or by an act of vandalism.
As the single line to ground fault is the most dangerous type, the SLG fault level will
be determined and used in the project analysis.
3.2.4 Verification of parameters
Resistance of timber, steel and concrete poles
Bonner, Erga, Gibbs & Gregorius (1989) describes how the electrical conductivity of
wood varies depending upon a number of factors. The resistance of timber will vary
depending upon the amount of moisture in the timber, and particularly the surface
moisture. The electrical resistance is less when measured along the grain rather than
across it. The resistance from one pole to the next is also affected by the species and
preservative treatment. Bonner et al. (1989) states that that test results indicate a
pole’s resistance ranging from 2500 Ohms when wet, to several megohms when dry.
Their paper, being a discussion of results from actual field tests, says three 40 foot
poles measured under different conditions had resistances in the range of 18000 Ohms
to 2 megohms.
Ragon, Shupe, Wu, Donohoe & Freeman (2010) performed a clinical study into the
effects of different preservative treatments on the conductivity of timber power poles.
The study was performed with the assistance of ABB who provided facilities and equip-
ment for the testing. The focus of the study was modern day preservative treatments
including creosote, Chromated Copper Arsenate (CCA), pentachlorophenol, and copper
napthenate. Their findings support Bonner et al. (1989) by verifying how the electrical
resistance of a pole varies wildly depending upon its moisture content, and to a lesser
degree, its species and type of preservative treatment. In their paper, Ragon et al.
(2010) quote Stamm, a researcher on the topic from the 1930s, who said “a change
in moisture content from zero to about 30% of the weight of wood, the conductivity
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increases a million fold”.
The electrical conductivity measurements from their tests, and conducted on one foot
long pole samples, are listed below in Table 3.5. For ease of interpretation, and for my
calculations, the conductivity values have been converted to an equivalent resistance per
metre value. This resistance value is based on a 12.5m 6kN preservative treated timber
pole which is a commonly used size in overhead distribution powerlines. According to
Essential Energy’s construction standards, this sized pole has an average diameter of
285mm.
Chemical treatment Conductivity Resistivity Resistance/metre
(σ/m) (Ω.m) (Ω/m)
Oven dry Creosote 1.60E-11 6.25E+10 9.80E+11
Penta 7.20E-12 1.39E+11 2.18E+12
CuNap 6.06E-12 1.65E+11 2.59E+12
CCA 4.40E-12 2.27E+11 3.56E+12
Untreated 1.60E-12 6.25E+11 9.80E+12
20% Moisture Penta 8.50E-07 1.18E+06 1.84E+07
Untreated 6.80E-07 1.47E+06 2.31E+07
CCA 6.40E-07 1.56E+06 2.45E+07
CuNap 6.30E-07 1.59E+06 2.49E+07
Creosote 5.00E-07 2.00E+06 3.14E+07
Saturated Untreated 3.10E-03 3.23E+02 5.06E+03
CCA 2.60E-03 3.85E+02 6.03E+03
CuNap 2.00E-03 5.00E+02 7.84E+03
Creosote 1.30E-03 7.69E+02 1.21E+04
Penta 1.10E-03 9.09E+02 1.43E+04
Table 3.5: Timber pole conductivity and resistance data
Sokolowski, Dwivedi, Pathak, Buratto & Yu (2008) refer to a publication of the Electric-
ity Authority of NSW,“Electrical Hazards Associated with Conductivity of Australian
Hardwood Power Line Poles”, which demonstrates“that seldom does a wooden power-
line pole exposed to natural weather conditions reach a moisture level exceeding much
more than 20%”
Whilst timber poles are the most common type used in distribution powerlines, the use
of steel and concrete poles is becoming more common. In comparison to timber, steel
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is a very conductive material. The resistivity of steel used for power poles is 190× 106
Ω.m (Gillespie 2013). It is shown in Section 4.2.4 that a standard 12.5m 12kN straight
steel pole with diameter of 273mm and wall thickness 4.7mm, will have a resistance of
46.9µΩ/m.
Concrete is a semi conductive material. However, most concrete poles are reinforced
with steel which greatly affects the practical resistance of the pole. A line worker for
instance might be using a pole step to stand on whilst working aloft. These steps
are bolts screwed into ferrules embedded in the pole, which are welded to the steel
reinforcing. Whilst this might not always be the case, it is reasonable to treat concrete
poles as conductive similar to steel poles.
Specifications of short circuiting and earthing equipment
Portable earths are designed and rated to withstand the electrical energy flowing by a
specific level of current for a minimum amount of time. For example, the rating of a
particular portable earthing set may be 6kA for 1.0 second. As explained by Australia
(n.d.), it is imperative that the set chosen for a task is rated to a higher fault level than
the maximum sized fault that can occur at the worksite. If an underrated set of earths
are used, they could fail for two reasons. Firstly, the high fault current may cause
excessive temperature rise in the cables and they may be melt. Secondly, the high fault
current can generate large magnetic fields causing the cables to move violently. In this
case, the cables may tear or even break away from their lugs or connection clamps.
Portable earthing sets are available with either aluminium or copper conductors. The
benefit of aluminium conductors is the reduced weight, and therefore, less strain for
the line worker who must apply them (Australia n.d.). Table 3.6 below has examples of
commercially available portable earthing sets and their ratings. The electrical resistance
information provided in column 4 has been obtained from AS/NZS 3008.1.1:2009. The
lead which connects the earth electrode to the short circuit bonds is normally supplied
at a maximum length of 20m.
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Current Time Conductor Conductor area Cable resistance 20m lead
rating rating (s) type (mm sq) (Ω/m) resistance (Ω)
10kA 0.5 Al 55 0.000704 0.01408
16kA 0.5 Al 85 0.000419 0.00838
25kA 0.5 Al 130 0.000276 0.00552
45kA 0.5 Al 2 x 130 0.000138 0.00276
3.5kA 1.0 Cu 16 0.00147 0.0294
6kA 1.0 Cu 25 0.000949 0.01898
8kA 1.0 Cu 35 0.000674 0.01348
12kA 1.0 Cu 50 0.000470 0.0094
16kA 1.0 Cu 70 0.000332 0.00664
20kA 1.0 Cu 95 0.000252 0.00504
30kA 1.0 Cu 120 0.000197 0.00394
40kA 1.0 Cu 150 0.000159 0.00318
Table 3.6: Common portable earthing sets
Soil resistivity and earth electrode resistance
When a powerline is de-energised for work, the line is isolated from the supply and then
short circuited and earthed prior to line workers commencing their work and making
contact with the conductors. In many cases, a permanently installed earthing conductor
is not available at the site. Therefore, the line workers must install a temporary earth
electrode for this purpose. This is usually achieved by driving an electrode into the
ground to a depth of approximately 0.5m.
The electrical resistance of the temporary electrode will be dependent on the soil resis-
tivity of the earth, the depth to which it is installed, and the moisture level of the soil.
Resistance readings taken at the site can be used to calculate the resistivity of the soil,
and to predict the resistance of the temporary electrode to earth.
Soil resistivity is determined by the equation (AS/NZS 4853 n.d.):
ρ = 2pi × a×R (3.14)
3.2 Analysis and results 44
Where:
a = horizontal spacing of test electrodes (m)
R = the resistance measurement obtained (Ω)
The predicted earth electrode resistance is then calculated by the equation (AS/NZS
4853 n.d.):
R =
ρ
2pil
log(
4l
r
− 1) (3.15)
Where:
l = proposed depth of electrode (m)
R = the expected resistance of electrode (Ω)
3.2.5 Essential Energy documents - Electrical Safety Rules and Equipo-
tential and Personal Protective Bonding
When preparing for work on de-energised lines, staff must consider the requirements of
two important documents. In Essential Energy’s jurisdiction, these are CEOP8030 -
Electrical Safety Rules (ESR), and CEOP2377 - Equipotential and Personal Protective
Bonding. These documents outline mandatory requirements for the application of
short circuit bonds and temporary earths, as well as personal protective bonds at the
worksite. In some cases, there will be multiple sets of temporary earths applied to the
de-energised section of line before work commences. As such, the protective bonding
applied at the worksite is just one component of a larger system of protection for the
line workers.
The requirements of both CEOP8030 and CEOP2377 have been taken into account in
the project analysis. Some specific requirements of these documents relevant to the
analysis is outlined below.
CEOP8030 - Electrical Safety Rules
• Access permit earths must be applied between all points of High Voltage (HV)
isolation and the work area.
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• When Access Permit Earths (APE) are not in view, a set of Working Earths
(WE) shall be installed at the work site. It is a requirement that at least one set
of earths shall be in view, and where practical, close to the persons working on
the conductors.
• When applying earths, if a known permanent earth is available, then it should
be used. If not, a metal stake of minimum 12mm diameter must be driven into
the ground ensuring that it is firmly anchored. (The document does not specify
a minimum depth or maximum earth electrode resistance).
• The Low Voltage (LV) neutral shall not be used as part of the HV earthing
system.
• Equipotential bonding must be applied to ensure there no possibility that persons
can form a bridge between two points of different potential.
CEOP2377 - Equipotential and Personal Protective Bonding
The purpose of this document is to ensure employees work under equipotential con-
ditions. The document outlines the procedures for installing PPB when working on
de-energised lines. For work on overhead powerlines, the selection of PPB technique is
dependent upon a number of conditions.
• If a permanent earthing conductor is available at the pole site.
• Whether the pole is timber, or, steel or concrete.
• If Access Permit Earths have been installed and whether these are in view of the
work site.
• the type of work being conducted and whether the task includes opening bonds
or dividing conductors.
On projects where APE earths are applied, and are within view of the worksite, ad-
ditional sets of earths are not required at the pole being worked on. However, the
procedure requires the installation of a personal protective bond from the overhead
conductor to a ’bonding point’ located below the workers feet. The bonding point
must be located a minimum 2.4m above ground level.
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The procedure does not specify minimum cable sizes for personal protective bonds.
Instead it requires that PPB must be ”rated similarly to earthing and short circuiting
equipment”.
Chapter 4
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4.1 Individual site analysis
4.1.1 Site 1 - Pole CE19317 Cooma Street, Queanbeyan
The first site analysed was pole number CE19317 located on Cooma Street, Quean-
beyan. The pole is located approximately 1.03km in line distance from the 11kV bus
at the zone substation.
Pole CE19317 is a 55’ (16.7m) timber pole treated with creosote preservative. The
pole is part of a dual circuit section of powerline supporting 66kV and 11kV overhead
conductors. A permanent earth cable is installed on the pole but is not connected to
any hardware at the pole top.
Figure 4.1: Pole CE19317 located at Cooma Street, Queanbeyan
Given the urban location of pole CE19317, the 11kV section of powerline can be en-
ergised from a number of alternative supply points. If the Southbar Road feeder is
disconnected at the Zone Substation, the line section can be supplied from the adja-
cent Queenbar Road or Karri Crescent feeders. It is also possible to supply the site via
the Michelago Feeder from Googong Zone Substation. Pole CE19317 has four possible
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points of supply in total, none of which are within sight of the pole.
For de-energised work to occur at pole CE19317, the Electricity Safety Rules require
access permit earths to be installed at each point of isolation. As the isolation points
are not in view of the worksite, a set of portable working earths at the pole will also
be required. A permanent earth is available at the pole so therefore, the bonding
configuration of Figure 2.6 of Section 2.4 must be used. The nearest upstream isolation
point on the Southbar Road 11kV feeder is at the Zone Substation, and therefore, the
access permit earths would be electrically connected to the substation earth grid.
Figure 4.2 is a connection diagram detailing the worksite connections, and its position
in relation to the other isolation points, and access permit earths.
The 11kV powerline at pole CE19317 could be at risk of three types of unexpected
energisation. The line could be energised by an accidental switching error, a transferred
potential rise from the zone substation, or by contact with the 66kV conductors located
above the 11kV circuit on the pole. An analysis of the PPBE performance in each of
these situations is following.
Resistance values of the worksite
The resistance values of the worksite must be known to evaluate the flow of fault current
caused by an accidental line energisation. The parameters shown in the worksite area
of Figure 4.2 are influenced by the pole size and timber type, the soil resistivity, cable
size of the PPB and permanent earth, as well as some other factors. The work site
resistance values used in the following analysis are listed in Table 4.1. A pole diagram
illustrating some of the important dimensions is shown in Figure 4.3. Other network
values including line impedances to be used in the calculations are summarised in Table
4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Connection diagram for de-energised worksite at pole CE19317 including iso-
lation locations and Access Permit Earths
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Figure 4.3: Dimensions of pole CE19317 at Site 1
The value RPTPE represents the contact resistance between the permanent earth cable
and the pole surface. At pole CE19317, the permanent earth cable is bare and making
contact with the pole. Therefore, the value of RPTPE will be relatively low. A more
modern practice is the use of insulated cables for permanent earths. In these cases,
a cable loop is made off the pole to allow an easily accessed connection point for test
lead or earth connections. When a connection is required, the line worker strips the
insulation in the loop and makes the connection.
Essential Energy’s CEOP2377 document does not explicitly state whether the PPB
should be in contact with the pole. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate in some
cases where the PPB is connected to an insulated cable, that there will be no electrical
contact between the PPB and pole surface. In the project analysis RPTPE can be made
very high (or practically infinite) to represent this situation.
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Input Value Notes
Pole length 16.8m 55’ obtained from pole button
Embedment 2.5m Estimated− Polelength× 0.1 + 0.8m
H11kV 9.1m 11kV conductor height
HLW 2.2m Line worker height including reach above head
BPattach 2.4m Bonding point - Minimum 2.4m required by ESR
Poletopsection 4.5m H11kV −HLW −BPattach
Polebottomsection 4.9m BPattach + Embedment
Rlineworker 900Ω Estimate from AS60479
Rtimber 31.4MΩ/m Creosote treated timber at 20% moisture level
Rpoletop 141.3MΩ/m Rtimber × Poletopsection
Rpolebottom 153.9MΩ Rtimber × Polebottomsection
Rpolefooting 37Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
RPTPE ∞ Permanent earth not in contact with pole
RPPB 0.0023Ω 5m× 50mmsqCucable
RP.Ecable 0.0017Ω 35mm sq Cu cable
RP.Eelectrode 88Ω Measured at site
RW.Ecable 0.0071Ω 15m× 35mmsqCucable
RW.Eelectrode 433Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
Table 4.1: Values used to determine equivalent resistance of worksite
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Input Value Notes
Zp1 Ω Sum of line section impedances S1 and S2 from Table 3.4
Zp2 Ω Line section impedance S3 from Table 3.4
Zp3 Ω Line section impedances S4 and S5 from Table 3.4
Zp4 Ω Sum of line section S6 and S7 impedances from Table 3.4
Zp5 Ω Line section impedance S2A from Table 3.4
Zp6 Ω Line section impedance S3A from Table 3.4
Rap1 Ω Resistance of portable earthing cables used at Zone sub isolation
Rap2cable Ω 15m x 50mm sq Cu cable
Rap2electrode Ω Nominal value
Rap3cable Ω 15m x 50mm sq Cu cable
Rap3electrode Ω Nominal value
Table 4.2: Line impedance and access permit earth values used in worksite analysis at pole
CE19317
Due to the network complexity of Site 1, the analysis is simplified if the worksite is
reduced to a single value. To determine an equivalent single value, loop analysis based
on Kirchoff’s Voltage Law has been used. For simplicity, the resistance values of the
worksite area in Figure 4.2 are combined as follows:
R1 = Rlw +Rpoletop
R2 = Rpolebottom +Rpolefooting
R3 = Rptpe
R4 = Rppb
R5 = RPEcable +RPEelectrode
R6 = RWEcable
R7 = RWEelectrode
The circuit for the loop analysis is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Simplified resistance network to determine total worksite resistance at pole
CE19317
A system of equations is determined as follows:
(R1 +R2)I1 −R1I2 −R2I3 = Vs (4.1)
−R1I1 + (R1 +R3 +R4 +R6)I2 −R3I3 −R4I4 = 0 (4.2)
−R2I1 −R3I2 + (R2 +R3 +R5)I3 −R5I4 = 0 (4.3)
−R4I2 −R5I3 + (R5 +R4 +R7)I4 = 0 (4.4)
The system of equations can be presented in Matrix form ZI = V . This has been done
for implementation into Matlab.

(R1 +R2) −R1 −R2 0
−R1 (R1 +R3 +R4 +R6) −R3 −R4
R2 −R3 (R2 +R3 +R5) −R5 = 0
0 −R4 −R5 (R5 +R4 +R7) = 0


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

1
0
0
0

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Matlab has been used to solve the equations and determine the loop currents. The
currents are found with the equation:
I = Z−1 × V (4.5)
The equivalent resistance of the worksite is equal to V divided by I1. With the input
values listed in Table 4.1, the total equivalent worksite resistance is calculated as 73.1
Ohms.
4.1.2 Pole CE19317 - Single phase energisation from zone substation
Analysis
The switching devices at the supply (and isolation) points for pole CE19317 all have
three phase operation. That is, when the device is opened or closed, all three phases are
switched simultaneously. The upstream protection device is the zone substation circuit
breaker, whilst the three other supply point devices are a enclosed Gas Switch (GS), Air
Break Switch (ABS), and switching station Ring Main Unit(RMU). Although a set of
single phase overhead links exist at the zone substation (at the overhead to underground
cable pole), it is unlikely these would be used as the primary method to de-energise
or re-energise the line. Therefore, the likelihood of a single phase energisation from
the substation occurring is relatively remote. However, whilst still technically possible,
and if it occurred it would be a worst case scenario, an analysis of such an event is
worthwhile and justified.
If a single phase energisation occurs, the fault current will flow back to the star point
of the zone substation transformer secondary winding. The presence of access permit
earths connected directly to the substation earth grid provide a very low impedance
path for the fault current to flow. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the majority
of the fault current will flow through this path, and that the risk posed to a lineworker
at pole CE19317 will be greatly reduced.
Figure 4.5 is the sequence diagram which models the flow of fault current should a single
phase energisation occur. From the figure it can be observed that the negative sequence
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and zero sequence networks are effectively bypassed by the application of access permit
earths at the zone substation.
Figure 4.5: Sequence diagram for fault analysis of accidental energisation from Zone Sub-
station
In understanding the seriousness of the hazard caused by a single phase energisation,
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it is important to know the maximum fault current that can flow. This emphasizes
the level of danger a line worker can be exposed if allowed to contact the line without
the proper protection. In this situation, the fault is caused by the sudden connection
of the earthed section of line to the energised system operating normally. To simplify
the calculation, the positive sequence network of the earthed section of line (see Figure
4.5) is first reduced to a single impedance.
Figure 4.6: Simplified sequence diagram of earthed section of powerline
Let
Za =
3Rws(Zp4 + 3Rss)
3Rws + Zp4 + 3Rss
= 7.732 + j0.0137pu
Let
Zb =
Z6(Zp3 + Za)
Za + Zp3 + Zp6
= 5.168 + j0.0147pu
Let
Zc =
Z5(Zp2 + Zb)
Z5 + Zp2 + Zb
= 3.877 + j0.0091pu
Let
Zd =
3Rap1(Zp1 + Zc + 3Rzs)
3Rap1 + Zp1 + Zc + 3Rzs
= 0.00436 + j0.0000pu
The equivalent sequence circuit is shown in Figure CE19317SPEZSSeq2a. The zero
sequence current can now be determined.
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Figure 4.7: Equivalent sequence circuit to determine maximum fault current
The maximum fault current which can flow as a result of the fault is:
If = 3× IO (4.6)
If = X
+
s +X
+
t +X
−
s +X
−
t +X
0
t + Zd (4.7)
If = 9834.2A
For a single phase energisation from the substation, the current flowing through the
worksite has been determined using loop analysis. A system of equations have been
developed to solve the currents in the circuit shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Simplified circuit to determine total fault current flowing as a result of accidental
energisation from Zone Substation
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Let
Zn = X
+
s +X
+
t +X
−
s +X
−
t +X
0
t (4.8)
ZnI1 + 3Rap1(I1 − I2) = Vs
(Zn + 3Rap1)I1 − 3Rap1I2 = Vs (4.9)
Rap1(I2 − I1) + 3RzsI2 + Z5(I2 − I3) + Zp1I2 = 0
−3Rap1I1 + (3Rap1 + 3Rzs + Z5 + Zp1)I2 − Z5I3 = 0 (4.10)
Z5(I3 − I2) + Z6(I3 − I4) + Zp2I3 = 0
−Z5I2 + (Z5 + Z6 + Zp2)I3 − Z6I4 = 0 (4.11)
Z6(I4 − I3) + 3Rws(I4 − I5) + Zp3I4 = 0
−Z6I3 + (Z6 + 3Rws + Zp3)I4 − 3RwsI5 = 0 (4.12)
3Rws(I5 − I4) + 3RssI5 + Zp4I5 = 0
−3RwsI4 + (3Rws + 3Rss + Zp4)I5 = 0 (4.13)
Matlab was used to solve the equations. To simplify the implementation in Matlab,
Equations 4.10 to 4.10, have been converted to the matrix form ZI = V .
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
(Zn + 3Rap1) −3Rap1 0 0 0
−3Rap1 (3Rap1 + 3Rzs −Z5 0 0
+Z5 + Zp1)
0 −Z5 (Z5 + Z6 + Zp2) −Z6 0
0 0 −Z6 (Z6 + 3Rws + Zp3) −3Rws
0 0 0 −3Rws (3Rws + 3Rss
Zp4)


I1
I2
I3
I4
I5

=

Vs
0
0
0
0

The loop currents are found with equation 4.14:
If = 3× Z−1 × V (4.14)
Referring to Figure 4.8, the total worksite current is equal to I4 - I5 times the 11kV
base current. The worksite current has been calculated as
Iws = 0.9A
.
The current flowing through the substation Access Permit Earths connected is equal
to I1 - I2 times the 11kV base current. This current is
IRap1 = 9823.2A
Conclusion
The analysis proves that the majority of fault current will flow back to the source
transformer via the APE at the substation. The APEs will effectively shield the worksite
should such a fault occur. The fault current of 0.9A at the work site is too low to be
dangerous, and is practically negligible. The lineworker will be safe in the event of a
single phase energisation.
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4.1.3 Pole CE19317 - Transferred potential from zone substation to
work site
Analysis
Examples highlighting the danger of Earth Potential Rise (EPR) are presented in Sec-
tion 2.5. For the isolation of the 11kV powerline for work on pole CE19317, APE’s must
be applied at the zone substation. The APE’s must therefore be directly connected to
the substation earth grid. It is therefore possible, a transferred potential from the earth
grid may energise the 11kV conductors at pole CE19317.
A dangerous situation can arise if a SLG fault occurs on another feeder supplied from
the substation. The ground fault will cause current to return to its source transformer
via the substation earth grid. A fault close to the substation will result in the highest
magnitude of current due to the absence of line impedance. Under normal operating
conditions, the maximum SLG fault current is approximately 9.1kA. The returning
fault current will cause a rise in the potential of the earth grid. The magnitude of
this potential rise is a function of Ohm’s Law. The installation of APE’s will result in
potential of the disconnected Southbar Rd 11kV feeder rising to the potential as the
earth grid. Therefore, this voltage will also be transferred to the worksite.
The connection diagram representing the transferred potential hazard is shown in Fig-
ure 4.9. The significance of the hazard can be seen by calculating the EPR of the
substation. The worst case will occur when the maximum possible level of fault cur-
rent flows. To model this situation, the fault resistance Rfault, as shown in the figure,
will set to 0Ω.
The EPR of the substation grid is calculated by using Ohm’s Law. The EPR is the prod-
uct of the fault current magnitude and zone substation earth grid resistance. The max-
imum level of fault current IfaultSLG is determined using Equation 4.19 and impedance
values representative of the 11kV bus.
X+bus = X
+
S +X
+
Tx (4.15)
X+bus = 0.038634 + 0.1011 pu
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X+bus = 0.139734 pu
X−bus = Z
−
S +X
−
Tx (4.16)
X−bus = 0.038634 + 0.1011 pu
X−bus = 0.139734 pu
X0bus = Z
0
S +X
0
Txpu (4.17)
X0bus = 0.050224 + 0.1011 pu
X0bus = 0.151324 pu
IfaultSLG =
3Van
X+bus +X
−
bus +X
0
bus
(4.18)
IfaultSLG =
3× 1.0
0.139734 + 0.139734 + 0.151324
× Ibase11
IfaultSLG = 9136A
The magnitude of EPR is determined:
GPR = If ×RZs (4.19)
GPR = 9136A× 0.3 Ω
GPR = 2740V
To assess the danger of EPR to the line worker at pole CE19317, an analysis of the
resulting fault current flow is required. Figure 4.10 shows the sequence diagram rep-
resenting the transferred potential situation. In Figure 4.10 it can be seen that the
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negative sequence and zero sequence networks are effectively short circuited by the
fault on the alternative feeder. A simplified sequence diagram is shown in Figure 4.12.
Loop analysis has been used to determine the current flowing in each part of the net-
work.
Input Value Notes
Rap1 0.00146 pu Resistance of access permit earths applied at ZS (50mm cable only)
Rap2cable 0.00146 pu Resistance of APE cable at G16540 (50mm cable)
Rap2electrode 5.165 pu Permanent earth electrode resistance at G16540 (from EE records)
Rap2 5.166 pu Total resistance of access permit earths (Rap2cable +Rap2electrode)
Rap3cable 0.00146 pu Resistance of APE cable at A2337 (50mm cable)
Rap3electrode 5.165 pu Permanent earth electrode resistance at G16540 (from EE records)
Rap3 5.166 pu Total resistance of access permit earths (Rap2cable +Rap2electrode)
Rss 3.099 pu Switching station earth grid resistance (from EE records)
Table 4.3: Resistance values of temporary earths applied at isolation locations
Using values from Tables 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3, the circuit can be analysed and the total
fault current determined. The parallel network formed by the temporary earths can be
reduced to a single equivalent value as follows:
Let
Za =
3Rws(Zp4 + 3Rss)
3Rws + Zp4 + 3Rss
= 2.588 + j0.0137pu (4.20)
Let
Zb =
(Za + Zp3)(Zp6 + 3Rap3)
Za + Zp3 + Zp6 + 3Rap3
= 1.734 + j0.0147pu (4.21)
Let
Zc =
(Zb + Zp2)(Zp5 + 3Rap2)
Zb + Zp2 + Zp5 + 3Rap2
= 1.299 + j0.0091pu (4.22)
Let
Zd =
3Rzs(Zp1 + Zc)
3Rzs + Zp1 + Zc
= 0.0592 + j0.0007pu (4.23)
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Figure 4.9: Connection diagram for Transferred Potential case caused by close in SLG fault
on an adjacent feeder
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Figure 4.10: Sequence diagram for current flow analysis of Transferred Potential case
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Figure 4.11: Sequence diagram for current flow analysis of Transferred Potential case
The magnitude of the fault current caused by the ground fault on the adjacent feeder
is calculated using equation 4.24:
If =
3× Van
X+s +X
+
T +X
−
s +X
−
T +X
0
T + 3× Zd + 3×Rf
(4.24)
If =
3× 1.0
j0.0485 + j0.011 + j0.0485 + j0.011 + j0.011 + 3(0.0605 + j0.0000355) + 3× 0)
If = 8984.6A
Figure 4.12: Simplified circuit diagram for use in solving current flow in event of transferred
potential case
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Now that the total fault current If is known, loop analysis can be used to determine the
portion of current which would flow through the worksite. Figure 4.12 is a simplified
sequence circuit used for this analysis. To simplify the calculations,
Let
Zn = X
+
s +X
+
T +X
−
s +X
−
T +X
0
T + 3×Rf
Let
Z5 = (Zp5 + 3Rap2)
Let
Z6 = (Zp6 + 3Rap3)
Referring to Figure 4.12, a system of equations is developed:
ZnI1 + 3Rzs(I1 − I2) = Vs
(Zn + 3Rzs)I1 − 3RzsI2 = Vs (4.25)
3Rzs(I1 − I2) + Z5(I2 − I3) + Zp1I2 = 0
−3RzsI1 + (3Rzs + Z5 + Zp1)I2 − Z5I3 = 0 (4.26)
Z5(I3 − I2) + Z6(I3 − I4) + Zp2I3 = 0
−Z5I2 + (Z5 + Z6 + Zp2)I3 − Z6I4 = 0 (4.27)
Z6(I4 − I3) + 3Rws(I4 − I5) + Zp3I4 = 0
−Z6I3 + (Z6 + 3Rws + Zp3)I4 − 3RwsI5 = 0 (4.28)
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3Rws(I5 − I4) + 3RssI5 + Zp4I5 = 0
−3RwsI4 + (3Rws + 3Rss + Zp4)I5 = 0 (4.29)
The equations are converted to the matrix form ZI = V . This allows for implementa-
tion into Matlab which will be used to determine the currents.

(Zn + 3Rzs) −3Rzs 0 0 0
−3Rzs (3Rzs + Z5 −Z5 0 0
+Zp1)
0 −Z5 (Z5 + Z6 −Z6 0
+Zp2)
0 0 −Z6 (Z6 + 3Rws −3Rws
+Zp3)
0 0 0 −3Rws (3Rws + 3Rss
+Zp4)


I1
I2
I3
I4
I5

=

Vs
0
0
0
0

The zero sequence loop currents are found by multiplying the inverse of the impedance
matrix by the voltage matrix. That is, I0 = Z
−1 × V . The zero sequence currents are
converted to the real fault currents by multiplying by three I0. Thus, If = 3× I0.
Results
Referring to Figure 4.12, the total worksite current Iws is equal to the difference between
currents I4 and I5. After using the values listed in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, and solving
in Matlab, the calculated worksite current is 34.9 Amps. The PPBE of the worksite is
configured as per Figure 4.31 of Section 2.4. With this bonding configuration, 34.9A is
a safe level of worksite current. This will be proven in Section 4.2.3.
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Referring to Figure 4.12, the actual EPR of the substation grid, and the voltage ap-
pearing across the worksite, can be calculated. The substation grid EPR is calculated
as shown in equation 4.30:
Vws = I4 × 3Rzs (4.30)
EPR = 2573.9V
The voltage transferred to the worksite is calculated as shown in equation 4.31:
Vws = (I4 − I5)× (I+p6 + 3Rws) (4.31)
Vws = 2555.6V
Therefore, almost the entire EPR of the substation grid has been transferred to the
worksite. Given the small size of the worksite current and the applied protective bond-
ing, the lineworker would be safe should if scenario eventuates. However, a transferred
potential of 2555V could be deadly if past protective bonding methods were used in-
stead.
In Section 2.5, the practice of ‘bracket earthing’ was discussed in the review of a paper
by Harrington & Martin (1954). Bracket earthing describes the practice of installing
temporary bonds and earths at poles either side of the worksite. In this syste, no
bonding is installed at the worksite itself. It was believed that the worker would be
shielded against any current flow by the earths on either side of the worksite. Had the
bracket earthing method outlined by Harrington been applied for pole CE19317, and
the pole been of a conductive material(such as steel), then the hazard for the lineworker
would be lethal. A fatality would be a reasonably likely possibility.
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4.1.4 Intermix of 66kV and 11kV circuits near worksite
Analysis
Pole CE19317 supports two high voltage overhead circuits. The top circuit is a 66kV
sub-transmission powerline, whilst the bottom circuit is the Southbar Road 11kV feeder.
The 66kV and 11kV dual circuit configuration exists for a line section of approximately
2.0km along the Cooma Road. No overhead earth wires are installed along this section
of dual circuit line.
A hazardous situation would occur if there was a clash, or ‘intermix’, between the
66kV and 11kV conductors. The powerline is designed with large spacing between the
circuits to ensure this does not happen under normal operation. However, there is a
real risk of such an event whilst construction activities are taking place. For example,
the uncontrolled movement of the 11kV conductors during a project to repair or replace
them.
The following analysis is of a 66kV and 11kV intermix close to the worksite location.
The first task is to determine the maximum prospective fault current that may flow.
Figure 4.13 shows the sequence diagram representing the intermix fault situation.
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Figure 4.13: Sequence diagram for fault analysis of a 66kV and 11kV ’intermix’ near the
worksite
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The equivalent upstream 66kV source impedance is known at the 66kV busbar at
South Queanbeyan Zone substation. The 66kV fault level at the busbar was provided
by Essential Energy’s protection engineers. The 66kV source impedances are calculated
in Equations 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11. The 66kV line distance from the substation to pole
CE19317 is 1.1km. The 66kV conductors are 7/4.50 AAC ‘Mercury’. Therefore the
66kV line impedance values are:
X+L66kV = 1.1 km× (0.315 + j0.259)
Ω
km
= 0.3465 + j0.2849 Ω (4.32)
X−L66kV = 1.1 km× (0.315 + j0.259)
Ω
km
= 0.3465 + j0.2849 Ω (4.33)
X0L66kV = 1.1 km× (0.315 + j0.777)
Ω
km
= 0.3465 + j0.8547 Ω (4.34)
The impedance values are converted to per unit by dividing by Zbase66 :
X+L66kV = 0.00198 + j0.00163 pu
X−L66kV = 0.00198 + j0.00163 pu
X0L66kV = 0.00198 + j0.00489 pu
To determine the magnitude of the resulting fault current, the earthed section sequence
impedances will be reduced to a single equivalent value Zd. For the purpose of deter-
mining a maximum current value, the fault contact resistance Rf is assumed to be
zero.
Let
Za =
(3Rap1 + 3Rzs + Zp1)(Zp5 + 3Rap2)
3Rap1 + 3Rzs + Zp1 + Zp5 + 3Rap2
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Let
Zb =
(Za + Zp2)(Zp6 + 3Rap3)
Za + Zp2 + Zp6 + 3Rap3
Let
Zc =
(Zb + Zp3)(3Rss + Zp4)
Zb + Zp3 + 3Rss + Zp4
Let
Zd =
(3Rss × Zc)
Zc + 3Rss
The zero sequence current is determined with Equation ??.
I0 =
1.0
X+s +X
+
L66kV
+X−s +X−L66kV +X
0
s +X
0
L66kV
+ 3Rf + Zd
(4.35)
The total fault current is three times the zero sequence current.
If = 3× IO (4.36)
Using the above source values from Equations 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11, and the line impedance
values calculated above, the fault current If flowing as a result of the 66kV and 11kV
intermix 2460.7A.
The worksite current can be determined by using Loop analysis. Figure 4.14 represents
the fault current circuit. Zc is the equivalent resistance of all the isolation access permit
earths which surround the worksite.
Figure 4.14: Simplified circuit diagram for determination of work site current
LetZN = X
+
s +X
−
s +X
0
s +X
+
L66kV
+X−L66kV +X
0
L66kV
+ 3Rf (4.37)
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To determine the loop current values I1 and I2, a system of equations has been devel-
oped:
ZnI1 + 3Rws(I1 − I2) = Vs
(Zn + 3Rws)I1 − 3RwsI2 = Vs (4.38)
Rws(I2 − I1) + ZcI2 = 0
−3RwsI1 + (3Rws + Zc)I2 = 0 (4.39)
The equations are presented in the matrix form ZI = V for easy solution in Matlab.(Zn + 3Rws) −3Rws
−3Rws (3Rws + Zc)
I1
I2
 =
Vs
0

The zero sequence currents I1 and I2 are found by Equation 4.40. The actual fault
currents is equal to three times the zero sequence currents.
I = Z−1 × V (4.40)
Referring to Figure 4.14, the worksite current is equal to I1 - I2 times the 66kV base
current (see Equation 3.7). Using Matlab, the worksite current has been calculated
Iws = 12.3
The equivalent worksite resistance was evaluated in Section 4.1.1 as 73.13Ω. Using
Ohm’s Law, the voltage appearing across the work site is:
Vws = Iws ×Rws = 12.3× 73.13Ω = 901.8V (4.41)
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Results
Whilst a large amount of fault current (2460A) flowed due to the contact between the
66kV and 11kV circuits, only a very small portion (12.3A) flowed through the worksite.
The installation of APEs at the multiple isolation points provided a low impedance path
for the majority of current to bypass the worksite.
A worksite fault current of 12.3A is not large enough to risk injury to the line worker.
The current would have passed through the working earths and PPB applied at the
worksite setup as per Figure 2.6. It is concluded the line worker would have remained
safe in the event of the circuit ’intermix’. More analysis on the PPB technique of Figure
2.6 is provided in Section sec:CEOP2377Fig3.
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4.1.5 Pole CE19321 - Old Cooma Road, South Queanbeyan
Pole CE19321 was selected as the second site for analysis. Pole CE19321 is located
on a hill top just outside the urban area of Queanbeyan. The pole is located 1.97km
in line distance from the Zone Substation. The pole location is on a radial section of
powerline and beyond the alternative supply points of other 11kV feeders.
Figure 4.15: Pole CE19321 located at Old Cooma Road near Queanbeyan
Pole CE19317 is a 60’ (18.3m) timber pole treated with creosote preservative. The pole
supports both 66kV and 11kV overhead conductors. The 11kV circuit is strained at
the pole with a enclosed gas switch installed. The gas switch is used to isolate supply
to the downstream section of line. A permanent earth cable is available on the pole.
The following analysis is for work occurring on one side of the pole with the gas switch
used as the only the network isolation. The ESR require a set of APE earths to
be applied to the conductors at the worksite. In accordance with CEOP2377, the
temporary earthing and personal protective bonding would be applied as per Figure
2.6 of Section 2.4. With this configuration, the APE must be bonded to the pole’s
permanent earth with a personal protective bond.
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Figure 4.16 provides details the worksite connections, and the upstream 11kV network.
The analysis is of a SLG fault which would be the most hazardous type for the line
worker. In this case, the fault current flows through the earth and possibly through the
worksite and line worker. It is acknowledged that a SLG fault would be considerably
unlikely to occur at this site. This is because the gas switch provides three phase
operation and can be locked open. However, the purpose of the analysis is to determine
whether the application of PPB will protect the worker. The results have relevance for
other similar work sites further along the powerline where the occurrence of a SLG is
more likely.
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Figure 4.16: Connection diagram for de-energised worksite at pole CE19321
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The performance of the applied PPB has been assessed by determining the magnitude
and path of fault current through the worksite. This has been done using the method
of symmetrical components as described in AS 3851 (AS 3851-1991 n.d.). A sequence
diagram representing the faulted circuit is provided in Figure 4.17. The line impedance
Zp represents the line impedance between the substation and pole site, and is equal to
the sum of line section impedances 1 to 9 of Table 3.2.
Figure 4.17: Sequence diagram for de-energised worksite at pole CE19321
To simplify calculations, the sequence impedance values of the energised network shown
in Figure 4.17, are combined to one equivalent value ZN .
ZN = X
+
S +X
+
T +X
−
S +X
−
T +X
0
T + Z
+
p + Z
−
p + Z
0
p + 3RZS (4.42)
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Figure 4.18: Simplified diagram for loop analysis of fault current for worksite of CE19321
Figure 4.18 is the circuit diagram used for loop analysis of the fault situation. To
determine the currents I1 to I4, a system of equations have been developed.
(Zn + 3Rapc + 3Rape)I1 − 3RapcI2 − 3RapeI3 = VS (4.43)
−3RapcI1 + (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb + 3Rptpe)I2− 3RppbI3− 3RptpeI4 = 0 (4.44)
−3RapeI1−3RppbI2+(3Rape+3Rppb+3Rpec+3Rpee)I3−(3RpecI3+3Rpee)I4 = 0 (4.45)
−3RptpeI2 − (3Rpec + 3Rpee)I3 + (3Rpee + 3Rpec + 3Rptpe + 3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)I4 = 0
(4.46)
The equations are now presented in matrix form for input into Matlab. Matlab was
used to solve the equations and determine the loop currents.
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
(Zn + 3Rapc −3Rapc −3Rape 0
+3Rape)
−3Rapc (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa −3Rppb −3Rptpe
+3Rppb + 3Rptpe)
−3Rape −3Rppb (3Rape + 3Rppb
+3Rpec + 3Rpee) −(3Rpec + 3Rpee)
0 −3Rptpe −(3Rpec + 3Rpee) (3Rpee + 3Rpec + 3Rptpe
+3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

Vs
0
0
0

As shown in equation 4.47, the loop currents I1 to I4 are found by multiplying the
inverse impedance matrix with the voltage matrix. These currents are the zero sequence
currents. The actual fault currents have been determined by multiplying the zero
sequence currents by three as per equation 4.48.
I0 = Z
−1 × V (4.47)
If = 3× I0 (4.48)
Referring to Figure 4.18, the critical worksite voltage and currents have been deter-
mined. The total fault current If is equal to I1. The total work site current Iws is also
equal to If . The current flowing in the PPB Ippb is equal to the difference between I2
and I3.
The worksite voltage Vws is equal to (I2 − I3) times Rapc plus (I1 − I3) times Rape.
The touch voltage experienced by the line worker is the voltage difference between the
overhead conductors, and the contact position on the pole. Vtouch is calculated as Vws
minus I4(Rpb +Rpolefooting).
Finally, the current that would flow through the line worker is equal to loop current I2.
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A script to perform the analysis was prepared in Matlab. A representative Matlab script
is included in Appendix B. A summary of the work site values used in the calculations
is provided in Table 4.4. A pole diagram illustrating important dimensions of the pole
is seen in Figure 4.3.
Input Value Notes
Pole length 18.3m 60’ length obtained from pole button
Embedment 2.63m Estimated− Polelength× 0.1 + 0.8m
H11kV 9.1m 11kV conductor height
HLW 2.2m Line worker height including reach above head
BPattach 2.4m Bonding point - Minimum 2.4m required by ESR
Poletopsection 4.5m H11kV −HLW −BPattach
Polebottomsection 4.9m BPattach + Embedment
Rlineworker 900Ω Estimate from AS60479
Rtimber 31.4MΩ/m Creosote treated timber at 20% moisture level
Rpoletop 141.3MΩ/m Rtimber × Poletopsection
Rpolebottom 135.0MΩ Rtimber × Polebottomsection
Rpolefooting 37Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
RPTPE 1Ω Permanent earth not in contact with pole
RPPB 0.0023Ω 5m x 50mm sq Cu cable
RP.Ecable 0.0017Ω 35mm sq Cu cable
RP.Eelectrode 30Ω Obtained at site
RW.Ecable 0.0071Ω 15m x 35mm sq Cu cable
RW.Eelectrode 1527.7Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
Table 4.4: Values used to in calculation of equivalent resistance of worksite
A summary of the critical work site currents and voltages determined in Matlab are in
Table 4.5.
IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
209.62 209.62 205.6 6170.6 2.60 0.00000
Table 4.5: Voltage and current values for energisation of work site at pole CE19321
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Conclusion
The results in Table 4.5 show a touch voltage of only 2.60V and zero current passing
through the path of the lineworker. The results prove the application of this PPB
technique will ensure the safety of the lineworker.
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4.1.6 Pole CE69899 - Quarry Road, South Queanbeyan
Pole CE69899 was selected as the third site for analysis. Pole CE69899 is located on
Quarry Road in the rural area to the south of Queanbeyan. The pole is located 3.26km
in line distance from the Zone Substation. The pole location is on a radial section of
powerline and beyond the alternative supply points of other 11kV feeders.
Figure 4.19: Pole CE69899 located at Quarry Road near Queanbeyan
Pole CE69899 is a 12.5m timber pole treated with CCA preservative treatment. The
pole supports 11kV overhead conductors only. The pole can be isolated from the 11kV
supply by opening the upstream links L10686. Pole CE69899 does not have a permanent
earth cable available on the pole.
The upstream links L10686 used to isolate the supply are not in view of the worksite.
Therefore, the ESR require APE earths to be applied at the pole where the links are
installed. In accordance with CEOP2377, a set of temporary working earths and a
personal protective bond are required at pole CE69899. The PPB would be attached
between the conductor being worked on and the pole below the workers feet. The
worksite would be set up as per Figure 2.4 of Section 2.4.
Figure 4.20 details the worksite connections, and the upstream 11kV network. The
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analysis is of a SLG fault which would be the most hazardous type for the line worker.
The links L10686 offer only single phase operation. It is plausible that a SLG fault
would occur in the event one link was closed by way of a switching error.
4.1 Individual site analysis 86
Figure 4.20: Connection diagram for de-energised worksite at pole CE69899
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The performance of the applied PPB will be assessed by first determining the magnitude
and path of fault current through the worksite. This is done using the method of
symmetrical components in accordance with AS 3851 (AS 3851-1991 n.d.). A sequence
diagram representing the fault circuit is provided in Figure 4.21. The line impedance
Zp represents the sum of line section impedances 1 to 12 of Table 3.2.
Figure 4.21: Sequence diagram for de-energised worksite at pole CE69899
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Figure 4.22: Simplified diagram for loop analysis of fault current for worksite of CE69899
To simplify calculations, the sequence impedance values of the energised network shown
of Figure 4.22, have been combined to one equivalent value Zn.
Zn = X
+
S +X
+
T +X
−
S +X
−
T +X
0
T + Z
+
p + Z
−
p + Z
0
p + 3RZS (4.49)
Figure 4.18 is the circuit diagram for loop analysis of the fault situation. To determine
the currents I1 to I4, a system of equations has been developed.
(Zn + 3Rapc + 3Rape)I1 − (3Rapc + 3Rape)I2 = VS (4.50)
−(3Rapc+3Rape)I1 +(3Rapc+3Rape+3Rwec+3Rwee+Zp1)I2− (3Rwec+3Rwee)I3 = 0
(4.51)
−(3Rwec+3Rwee)I2+(3Rwec+3Rwee+3Rpolefooting+3Rpa+3Rpb+3Rlw)I3−(3Rlw+3Rpa)I4 = 0
(4.52)
−(3Rlw + 3Rpa)I3 + (3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb)I4 = 0 (4.53)
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The equations can be expressed in matrix form ready for input into Matlab. Matlab
has been used to solve the equations and determine the loop currents.

(Zn + 3Rapc + 3Rape) −(3Rapc + 3Rape) 0 0
−(3Rapc + 3Rape) (3Rapc + 3Rape + ZP1 −(3Rwec + 3Rwee) 0
+3RWEC + 3RWEE)
0 −(3Rwec + 3Rwee) (3Rwec + 3Rwee −(3Rlw + 3Rpa)
+Rpolefooting + 3Rpa
+3Rpb + 3Rlw)
0 0 −(3Rlw + 3Rpa) (3Rlw + 3Rpa
+3Rppb)


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

Vs
0
0
0

As shown in equation 4.54, the loop currents I1 to I4 are found by multiplying the
inverse impedance matrix with the voltage matrix. These currents represent the zero
sequence currents. The actual fault currents are equal to three times the zero sequence
currents as shown in Equation 4.55.
I0 = Z
−1 × V (4.54)
If = 3× I0 (4.55)
Referring to Figure 4.22, critical worksite voltage and currents can be determined. The
total fault current If is equal to loop current I1. The worksite current Iws is equal to
I2. The current flowing through the PPB Ippb is equal to I4.
The worksite voltage Vws is equal to (I2 − I3) times (RWEC + RWEE). The touch
voltage experienced by the line worker is the voltage difference between the overhead
conductors, and the contact position on the pole. Vtouch is calculated as Vws minus
I3(Rpb +Rpolefooting).
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Finally the current that would flow the the line worker is equal to loop current I3− I4.
A script to perform the analysis was prepared in Matlab. A representative Matlab
script is included in Appendix B. A summary of the work site values used for the
calculations is provided in Table 4.6. Figure 4.3 illustrates dimensions of the pole
which are important in the calculations.
Input Value Notes
Pole length 12.5m Obtained from pole button
Embedment 2.05m Estimated− Polelength× 0.1 + 0.8m
H11kV 10.05m 11kV conductor height
HLW 2.2m Line worker height including reach above head
BPattach 2.4m Bonding point - Minimum 2.4m required by ESR
Poletopsection 5.85m H11kV −HLW −BPattach
Polebottomsection 4.45m BPattach + Embedment
Rlineworker 900Ω Estimate from AS60479
Rtimber 24.5MΩ/m Creosote treated timber at 20% moisture level
Rpoletop 143.3MΩ/m Rtimber × Poletopsection
Rpolebottom 109MΩ Rtimber × Polebottomsection
Rpolefooting 37Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
RPPB 0.0023Ω 5m x 50mm sq Cu cable
RA.Pcable 0.00705Ω 50mm sq Cu cable
RA.Pelectrode 1930Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
RW.Ecable 0.0071Ω 15m× 35mmsqCucable
RW.Eelectrode 1930Ω Calculated with Equation 3.15
Table 4.6: Values used to in calculation of equivalent resistance of worksite
A summary of the critical work site currents and voltages determined in Matlab are in
Table 4.7.
4.1 Individual site analysis 91
IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
6.57 3.29 0.00006 6342.8 0.000 0.00000
Table 4.7: Voltage and current values for energisation of work site at pole CE19321
Conclusion
The results in Table 4.7 show that there was zero current flowing through the PPB.
This is due to the high timber resistance of the pole in series with the lineworker and
earth. The lineworker would most probably have been safe even if the PPB had not
been applied. However, with PPB in place, there would be no doubt that equipotential
conditions would be maintained across the line workers work area.
Due to the high resistance values of the APE and WE electrodes, the fault current
flowing as a result of the energisation, was relatively small at 6.57A. An interesting
situation would arise if pole CE69899 was a steel pole instead of timber. The conductive
property of steel, and its relatively low footing resistance when compared with the APE
and WE electrodes, would provide low impedance path for the fault current to flow. A
much higher fault current would flow as a result. With the line worker in series with
the pole, the performance of the PPB would become much more important.
In the analysis for the worksite at pole CE19317 (Section 4.1.2), the APE’s either side
of the pole diverted the fault current away from the worksite. The APE’s in that case
provided useful protection. However, at pole CE69899, the APE and WE do not offer
the same protection for a SLG fault due to the high resistance of their electrodes. The
majority of fault current arising through an unexpected single phase energisation will
flow through the pole the worker is standing on.
Further analysis on the performance of the PPB on steel poles is provided in Section
4.2.5.
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4.2 Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing Technique
Analysis
The site analysis in Section 4.1 demonstrated the effectiveness of the current PPB
practices, as shown in Figures 2.4 to 2.8 of Section 2.4, when applied in real situations.
However, it was decided that the analysis did not test against a broad enough range of
possible site conditions. Therefore, further analysis of the practices is needed.
This analysis is a test each of each technique against a varying range of theoretical
site conditions. Many of the factors which determine the level of fault current, touch
voltage, and the degree of hazard, will vary from pole to pole, and network to network.
The aim of the analysis is to identify whether conditions can occur where the PPB will
not adequately protect the lineworker.
4.2.1 Bonding application shown in CEOP2377 Figure 1
Analysis
This analysis is of the bonding technique shown in Figure 2.4. The technique is used on
timber poles when APE are applied at the upstream isolation position, and are in view
of the work site. The technique is the attachment of a PPB between the conductor
being worked on, and the pole, at a position below the line worker’s feet. When the
line worker needs to work on the other conductors, they must relocate the PPB to that
conductor before making contact with any part of their body.
The analysis is of a hypothetical work site located immediately outside the zone substa-
tion. In this situation the performance of the PPB is analysed under maximum fault,
or, worst case conditions. The only line impedance is from the isolation point to the
work site. The analysis includes variance of this line impedance to examine the effect
of this on the performance of the PPB technique.
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Figure 4.23: Worksite set up immediately downstream of zone substation
Figure 4.24 shows a simple connection diagram of the network situation under test.
Figure 4.25 shows a sequence diagram representing of a SLG fault energised at the
isolation point just outside the substation. The diagram is further simplified in Figure
4.26.
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Figure 4.24: Schematic diagram of personal protective bonding technique shown in Figure
2.4
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Figure 4.25: Sequence diagram used to determine fault current flow
The maximum fault current, the worksite current, and touch voltage experienced by
the line worker is now determined. Loop analysis is used to calculate the fault current
through the APE and worksite. Figure 4.26 is circuit diagram to be used for the loop
analysis.
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Figure 4.26: Simplified circuit for loop analysis
To determine the current I1, I2, and I3, a system of equations is developed as follows.
Let
ZN = X
+
S +X
+
T +X
−
S +X
−
T +X
0
T + 3RZS + 3Rf (4.56)
and
3RAP = 3RAPC + 3RAPE (4.57)
then
(ZN + 3RAP )I1 − 3RAP I2 = VS (4.58)
and
−3RAP I1+(3RAP+ZP+3RLW+3RPA+3RPB+3RPolefooting)I2−(3RLW+3RPA)I3 = 0
(4.59)
−(3RLW + 3RPA)I2 + (3RLW + 3RPA + 3RPPB)I3 = 0 (4.60)
The Equations 4.58 to 4.60 are now represented in matrix form. This facilitates easy
implementation into Matlab which was used to solve the equations.
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
(ZN + 3RAP ) −3RAP 0
−3RAP (3RAP + ZP + 3RLW + 3RPA −(3RLW + 3RPA)
+3RPB + 3RPolefooting)
0 −(3RLW + 3RPA) (3RLW + 3RPA + 3RPPB)


I1
I2
I3
 =

Vs
0
0

The zero sequence current is found by Equation 4.61:
I0 = Z
−1 × V (4.61)
The actual fault current is equal to 3I0
The ‘touch voltage’ Vtouch is the voltage appearing across the body of the line worker.
Vtouch is equal to the difference in voltage between the overhead conductors (the ‘work
site’ voltage Vws) and the bonding point Vbp.
The worksite voltage is found by equation 4.62:
Vws = I3Rppb + I2(Rppb +Rpolefooting) (4.62)
The bonding point voltage is found by equation 4.63:
Vbp = I2(Rppb +Rpolefooting) (4.63)
The touch voltage is determined by equation 4.64:
Vtouch = Vws − Vbp (4.64)
In reality many of the input values used in the calculations would vary depending upon
the worksite location, the substation size and configuration, and other factors such as
soil resistivity. To test the performance of this PPB technique, input values which
could realistically change in practice have been varied. The resulting critical voltage
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and currents have then been recorded. The initial input values for the calculations are
summarised in Table 4.8. The calculated results are displayed in Tables 4.9 to ??
Input variable Value Unit Notes
Powerline distance 40 m Distance between APE and worksite
ZP 0.000167 +j0.000228 Ω/m Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR)
RAP cable 0.00498 Ω 70mm
2 sq Cu - rated 16kAs
Soil resistivity 100 Ω.m
RAP electrode 50 Ω Nominal value
RLW 900 Ω Resistance of lineworker
Pole length 11.0 m Total length
Line worker height 2.2 m Includes reach
Bonding Point Attachment 2.4 m Height above ground
Rtimber 2.45× 107 Ω/m CCA pole at 20% moisture
RPA 110.25 MΩ Pole section between LW and BP
RPB 105.35 MΩ Pole section below BP
Rpolefooting 37 Ω Estimated
RPPB 0.00337 Ω 5m length
Table 4.8: Initial input values for analysis of PPB bonding method of Figure 2.4
Powerline length (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 40m 126.2 0.0000 0.0001 6312.8 0.0000 0.0000
100 126.2 0.0000 0.0001 6312.8 0.0000 0.0000
250 126.2 0.0000 0.0001 6312.8 0.0000 0.0000
500 126.2 0.0000 0.0001 6312.8 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.9: Critical voltage and current values with changes in powerline length (ZP )
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RAP elecrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 50 126.2 0.0001 0.0001 6312.8 0.000 0.0000
10 615.4 0.0001 0.0001 6161.3 0.000 0.0000
500 12.7 0.0001 0.0001 6347 0.000 0.0000
1000 6.3 0.0001 0.0001 6348.9 0.000 0.0000
Table 4.10: Critical voltage and current values with changes in APE electrode resistance
(RAP )
RPPB (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
50mm2 Cu 126.2 0.0001 0.0001 6312.6 0.000 0.0000
95mm2 Cu 126.2 0.0001 0.0001 6312.6 0.000 0.0000
Table 4.11: Critical voltage and current values with changes PPB cable size (RPPB)
Attachment height (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.4m 126.2 0.00006 0.00006 6312.6 0.000 0.0000
6.9m 126.2 0.00003 0.00003 6312.6 0.000 0.0000
Table 4.12: Critical voltage and current values with change in Bonding Point attachment
height
Rtimber (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.45× 107 (20% moisture) 126.2 0.00006 0.00006 6312.58 0.0000 0.0000
6.03× 103 (saturated) 126.2 0.2431 0.2431 6312.47 0.0008 0.0000
Table 4.13: Critical voltage and current values with change in timber resistance (Rtimber)
Results
The performance of the application technique shown in Figure 2.5 was tested by varying
a number of site parameters. The results in Tables 4.9 to 4.13 demonstrate how this
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technique provides excellent protection to the lineworker. The touch voltage Vtouch was
kept to less than 1mV under all test conditions.
The resistance of the timber pole provided a very high impedance to the flow of current
through the worksite. As such, the sizing of the PPB or its attachment height made no
impact upon the outcome. The fault current that flowed as a result of the energisation
flowed almost exclusively through the APE. Equipotential conditions were maintained
for the lineworker aloft on the pole.
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4.2.2 Bonding application shown in CEOP2377 Figure 2
Analysis
The following analysis is of the bonding technique shown in Figure 2.5. The technique
is similar to that of Figure 2.4 in that a PPB is used, APE are applied at the upstream
isolation point, and the APE must be in view of the worksite. The key difference is
that the PPB is connected to a Permanent Earth (PE) at the pole being worked on.
This technique only applies to timber poles.
A permanent earth is an earthing conductor connected to an electrode below ground
and attached to the pole above ground. Permanent earths often exist at substation
poles, or at ’operational’ poles. Operational poles are those which have network switch
gear, such as an Air Break Switch, at the pole top. Permanent earths are also found
on poles where lightning arresters are installed on the pole.
The analysis is of the bonding method performance under maximum fault conditions.
In a practical situation, these conditions would exist just outside the zone substation
where line impedance is minimised and fault levels are highest. The APE are assumed
to be one span away but as part of the analysis, the line distance is varied to examine
this effect on the performance of the PPBE.
Figure 4.27 is the connection diagram representing the upstream APEs, the line impedance,
and the worksite PPB and permanent earth. A resistance Rptpe is shown between the
bonding point and between pole resistance values Rpa and Rpb. In the past, many
permanent earths were installed using bare copper cable. This resistance represents
the contact between a bare earth cable and the pole. The modern practice is the use of
an insulated earth cable where a cable loop is provided above ground and a test point.
Essential Energy’s CEOP2377 does not stipulate whether the PPB must be in contact
with the pole when connected to the permanent earth. Therefore, in some cases, the
pole and permanent earth cable may be electrically disconnected. The inclusion of
resistance Rptpe allows both scenarios to analysed to see if this has an effect on the
performance of this bonding technique.
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Figure 4.27: Schematic diagram of personal protective bonding technique shown in Figure
2.5
Figure 4.28: Worksite set up immediately downstream of zone substation
Figure 4.29 is a sequence diagram representing a single line to ground fault which would
occur at the substation. This type of fault would cause the maximum fault current to
flow through earth, and therefore, test the performance of this bonding technique in a
worst case scenario. The sequence diagram shows the energised ’normally operating’
system source and transformer impedances, as well as the section of line earthed by the
APE and PPB and PE.
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The value Zn is the sum of the upstream system impedances which will limit the size
of fault current available at the work site. Zn has been determined to simplify the
following calculations.
Figure 4.29: Sequence diagram used to determine fault current flow
Figure 4.30 is a simplified circuit used for loop analysis. When the values of current, I1
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to I4, are determined, it is possible to determine the maximum work site current, and
the prospective touch voltage a line worker may be exposed to. The degree of safety
this bonding technique provides can then be critically assessed.
Figure 4.30: Simplified circuit for loop analysis
To determine the currents I1, I2, I3 and I4, a system of equations is developed as
follows.
Let
Zn = X
+
S +X
+
T +X
−
S +X
−
T +X
0
T + 3RZS + 3Rf (4.65)
then
(Zn + 3Rap)I1 − 3RapI2 = Vs (4.66)
then
−3RapI1 + (3Rap + Zp + 3R1 + 3R2)I2 − 3R1I3 − 3R2I4 = 0 (4.67)
−3R1I2 + (3R1 + 3Rptpe + 3Rppb)I3 − 3RptpeI4 = 0 (4.68)
−3R2I2 − 3RptpeI3 + (3R2 + 3Rptpe + 3Rpe)I4 = 0 (4.69)
Equations 4.66 to 4.69 can now be represented in Matrix form to allow Matlab to be
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used for easy solution. As can be seen in Figure 4.30, current I1 equals the total fault
current flowing as a result of the single line to ground fault occurring. The current
through the APE is the difference between currents I1 and I2. The total worksite
current is equal to I2. The touch current experienced by a line worker is the difference
between I2 and I3. The current carried by the PPB is the difference between I3 and
I4.

(Zn + 3Rap) −3Rap 0 0
−3Rap (3Rap + 3R1 + 3R2 + Zp) −3R1 −3R2
0 −3R1 (3R1 + 3Rptpe + 3Rppb) −3Rptpe
0 −3R2 −3Rptpe (3R2 + 3Rptpe + 3Rpe


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

Vs
0
0
0

A Matlab script has been developed to perform the required calculations and allow
experimentation with the input values. A representative Matlab script is included in
Appendix B. The initial input values used in the calculations are listed in Table 4.14.
Input values which could realistically change in practice have been varied and the
resulting critical voltage and currents recorded. The calculated results are displayed in
Tables 4.15 to 4.21
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Input variable Value Unit Notes
Powerline distance 40 m Distance between APE and worksite
ZP 0.000167 +j0.000228 Ω/m Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR)
RAP cable 0.00498 Ω 70mm
2 sq Cu - rated 16kAs
Soil resistivity 100 Ω.m
RAP electrode 50 Ω Nominal value
RPE cable 0.0027 Ω 35mm
2 sq Cu cable
RPE electrode 30 Ω Estimated value
RLW 900 Ω Resistance of lineworker
Pole length 11.0 m Total length
Line worker height 2.2 m Includes reach
Bonding Point Attachment 2.4 m Height above ground
Rtimber 2.45× 107 Ω/m CCA pole at 20% moisture
RPA 110.25 MΩ Pole section between LW and BP
RPB 105.35 MΩ Pole section below BP
Rpolefooting 37 Ω Estimated
RPPB 0.00337 Ω 5m length
RPTPE 1 Ω (If present)
Table 4.14: Initial input values for analysis of PPB bonding method of Figure 2.5
Variance of ZP :
Powerline length (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 40m 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249.0 0.702 0.0000
100 333.13 208.18 208.18 6248.3 0.702 0.0000
250 333.08 208.12 208.12 6246.5 0.702 0.0000
500 332.97 208.02 208.02 6243.6 0.701 0.0000
Table 4.15: Critical voltage and current values with changes in powerline length (ZP )
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RAP elecrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 50 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249.0 0.702 0.0000
10 811.7 202.96 202.96 6098.1 0.685 0.0000
500 221.9 209.37 209.37 6283.1 0.706 0.0000
1000 215.7 209.44 209.44 6285.1 0.705 0.0000
Table 4.16: Critical voltage and current values with changes in APE electrode resistance
(RAP )
RPE electrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
1 4485.7 4396.9 4396.9 4637.2 15.53 0.0000
10 733.5 611.2 611.2 6122.3 2.062 0.0000
50 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249.0 0.702 0.0000
500 138.8 12.62 12.61 6308.9 0.043 0.0000
1000 132.5 6.31 6.31 6310.9 0.021 0.0000
Table 4.17: Critical voltage and current values with changes in permanent earth electrode
resistance (RAP )
RPPB (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
35mm2 Cu 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 0.701 0.0000
95mm2 Cu 333.17 208.2 208.2 6248.9 0.262 0.0000
Table 4.18: Critical voltage and current values with changes PPB cable size (RPPB)
Attachment height (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.4m 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 0.701 0.0000
6.9m 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 0.701 0.00078
Table 4.19: Critical voltage and current values with change in Bonding Point attachment
height
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Rtimber (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.45× 107 (20% moisture) 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249.0 0.701 0.0000
6.03× 103 (saturated) 333.39 208.45 208.45 6248.9 0.943 0.00003
Table 4.20: Critical voltage and current values with change in timber resistance (Rtimber)
RPTPE (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
1 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 0.701 0.0000
10 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 0.701 0.0000
1000 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249.0 0.701 0.0000
1 x 109 333.16 208.2 208.2 6249 3032 0.00003
Table 4.21: Critical voltage and current values with changes in resistance between pole and
permanent earth (RPTPE)
Results
The following results were observed from the analysis:
• Increasing the line impedance Zp from 40m to 500m had negligible impact on
results. From the results it can be seen that the touch voltage Vtouch decreases
slightly as Zp increases.
• Varying the resistance of the access permit earth electrode Rap made no impact
upon the voltages and currents at the worksite.
• Using a larger PPB reduces the size of Vtouch. However, Vtouch was so small
under worst case conditions that no practical benefit would be achieved from an
oversized PPB cable.
• The results indicate that a lower bonding point attachment height is preferable.
This ensures a larger length of timber pole, and therefore larger series impedance,
between the line worker’s feet and the bonding point for the PPB. The value of
ILW is reduced with a lower bonding point attachment.
• Varying the resistance of the timber pole did not significantly affect the results.
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• Varying the connection resistance Rptpe between the pole surface and permanent
earth did not influence the results. Provided that a solid connection is made
between the PPB and permanent earth cable, the majority of fault current will
flow through this path.
The performance of the application technique shown in Figure 2.5 was tested by varying
a number of site parameters. Under all test conditions, the resulting values of Vtouch
and ILW were at very safe levels. Therefore, the bonding technique of Figure 2.5 can
be considered safe and effective.
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4.2.3 Bonding application shown in CEOP2377 Figure 3
Analysis
The following analysis is of the bonding technique shown in Figure 2.6. This technique
is used when earthing and shorting is required at the pole being worked on. Earthing
and short circuiting will be required at the work site under two conditions. Firstly, the
APE at the isolation point is out of view and a set of ‘working earths’ are required in
accordance with the Electrical Safety Rules. Secondly, the work site is located close to
the isolation point, and the earthing and short circuiting at the pole is the APE. When
earthing and short circuiting is provided at the pole, and a permanent earth exists also,
the permanent earth and temporary earths must be bonded together with a personal
protective bond.
Figure 4.31: Schematic diagram of personal protective bonding technique shown in Figure
2.4
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The purpose of this analysis is to verify the effectiveness of this bonding method under
maximum fault conditions. In a practical situation, the worst case conditions will occur
close to the zone substation where line impedance is negligible and the prospective fault
level at a maximum. The analysis is based on just one set of temporary earths being
applied. However, in many practical situations (but not all), distribution feeders leaving
a substation have ties to alternative feeders. Therefore, additional sets of temporary
earths and short circuits will be installed, and the level of risk to the lineworker reduced.
Figure 4.31 is the connection diagram detailing the worksite resistive components. The
value Rptpe is included to represent the electrical contact that may or may not exist
between the permanent earth and the pole, or the PPB and the pole. Figure 4.32 illus-
trates the fault situation located just outside the substation. The worksite (including
APE) are shown to be one span away. This allows the effect of line distance on the
results to be analysed as well.
Figure 4.32: Worksite set up immediately downstream of zone substation
Figure 4.33 shows the sequence diagram used to determine the maximum fault current
that can flow. The sequence diagram is representative of a single line to ground fault.
As such, the positive, negative and zero sequence networks are connected in series. The
SLG fault would be be the most serious as it would cause the largest flow of current
through the work site and to earth.
4.2 Personal Protective Bonding and Earthing Technique Analysis 112
Figure 4.33: Sequence diagram used to determine fault current flow
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Figure 4.34 is a simplified circuit used for loop analysis. When the values of current,
I1 to I4, are determined, it is possible to determine the maximum work site current, as
well as the prospective touch voltage a line worker may be subjected to. The degree of
safety this bonding technique provides may then be critically assessed.
Figure 4.34: Simplified circuit for loop analysis
To determine the currents I1, I2, I3 and I4, a system of equations has been developed
as follows.
(Zn + Zp + 3Rapc + 3Rape)I1 − 3RapcI2 − 3RapeI3 = VS (4.70)
−3RapcI1 + (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb + 3Rptpe)I2− 3RppbI3− 3RptpeI4 = 0 (4.71)
−3RapeI1−3RppbI2+(3Rape+3Rppb+3Rpec+3Rpee)I3−(3RpecI3+3Rpee)I4 = 0 (4.72)
−3RptpeI2 − (3Rpec + 3Rpee)I3 + (3Rpee + 3Rpec + 3Rptpe + 3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)I4 = 0
(4.73)
Equations 4.70 to 4.73 can now be represented in Matrix form to allow Matlab to be
used for easy solution. As can be seen in Figure 4.34, current I1 equals the total fault
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current flowing as a result of the single line to ground fault occurring. The current
through the APE is the difference between currents I1 and I2. The total worksite
current is equal to I2. The touch current experienced by a line worker is the difference
between I2 and I3. The current carried by the PPB is the difference between I3 and
I4.

(Zn + Zp −3Rapc −3Rape 0
3Rapc + 3Rape)
−3Rapc (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa −3Rppb −3Rptpe
+3Rppb + 3Rptpe)
−3Rape −3Rppb (3Rape + 3Rppb
+3Rpec + 3Rpee) −(3RpecI3 + 3Rpee)
0 −3Rptpe −(3Rpec + 3Rpee) (3Rpee + 3Rpec + 3Rptpe
+3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

Vs
0
0
0

The ‘touch voltage’ Vtouch is the voltage appearing across the body of the line worker.
Vtouch is equal to the difference in voltage between the overhead conductors (the ‘work
site’ voltage Vws) and the bonding point Vbp.
The worksite voltage is found by equation 4.74:
Vws = (I1 − I2)Rap−cable + (I1 − Ie)Rap−electrode (4.74)
The bonding point voltage is found by equation 4.75:
Vbp = I4(Rpb −Rpolefooting) (4.75)
The touch voltage is determined by equation 4.76:
Vtouch = Vws − Vbp (4.76)
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Vtouch and its duration are significant factors affecting the amount of current experi-
enced by the line worker. The actual current will depend upon other factors including
the body current path, size of the line worker, and the contact surface area. A nominal
line worker resistance value of 900Ω has been selected for these calculations. Although
in practice the real resistance will vary, this value provides a reasonable indication of
line worker current, and therefore, how well the PPB technique has worked.
A Matlab script has been developed to perform the required calculations and allow
experimentation with the input values. A representative Matlab script is included in
Appendix B. The initial input values used in the calculations are listed in Table 4.22.
Input values which could realistically change in practice have been varied and the
resulting critical voltage and currents recorded. The results are provided in Tables 4.26
to 4.28.
Input variable Value Unit Notes
Powerline distance 40 m Distance between APE and worksite
ZP 0.000167 +j0.000228 Ω/m Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR)
RAP cable 0.00498 Ω 70mm
2 sq Cu - rated 16kAs
Soil resistivity 100 Ω.m
RAP electrode 206.9 Ω Calculated value at 0.5m depth
RPE cable 0.002656 Ω 35mm
2 cable
RPE electrode 88 Ω Estimated value
RLW 900 Ω Resistance of lineworker
Pole length 11.0 m Total length
Line worker height 2.2 m Includes reach
Bonding Point Attachment 2.4 m Height above ground
Rtimber 2.45× 107 Ω/m CCA pole at 20% moisture
RPA 110.25 MΩ Pole section between LW and BP
RPB 105.35 MΩ Pole section below BP
Rpolefooting 37 Ω Estimated
RPPB 0.00337 Ω 5m length
RPTPE 0.1 Ω (If present)
Table 4.22: Initial input values for analysis of PPB bonding method of Figure 2.6
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Variance of ZP :
Powerline length (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 40m 102.3 102.3 71.8 6319.8 2.708 0.0000
100 102.3 102.3 71.79 6319.5 2.708 0.0000
250 102.3 102.29 71.76 6318.6 2.707 0.0000
500 102.3 102.27 71.75 6317.2 2.707 0.0000
Table 4.23: Critical voltage and current values with changes in powerline length (ZP )
RAP elecrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
10 681.8 681.8 69.57 6138.8 16.67 0.0000
Initial - 206.9 102.3 102.3 71.8 6319.8 2.708 0.0000
500 84.5 84.5 71.85 6325.2 2.279 0.0000
1000 78.2 78.2 71.87 6327.1 2.127 0.0000
Table 4.24: Critical voltage and current values with changes in APE electrode resistance
(RAP )
RPE elecrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
1 4575.5 4575.5 4553.4 4691.1 125.63 0.0000
Initial - 30 102.3 102.3 71.8 6319.8 2.708 0.0000
10 642.9 642.9 613.2 6151.2 17.561 0.0000
500 43.3 12.673 12.673 6337.7 1.086 0.0000
1000 37.0 37.0 6339 6339.7 0.913 0.0000
Table 4.25: Critical voltage and current values with changes in permanent earth electrode
resistance (RPE)
RPPB (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW µA
35mm2 Cu 4575 4575 4553 4691 125.63 1.14
95mm2 Cu 4582 4582 4560 4683 116.19 1.06
Table 4.26: Critical voltage and current values with changes PPB cable size (RPPB)
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Attachment height (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.4m 102.3 102.3 71.8 6319.8 2.708 0.0000
6.9m 102.3 102.3 71.8 6319.8 2.705 0.0030
Table 4.27: Critical voltage and current values with change in Bonding Point attachment
height
Rtimber (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (A)
2.45× 107 (20% moisture) 4575.5 4575.5 4553.4 4691.1 125.63 0.0000
6.03× 103 (saturated) 4575.7 4575.7 4553 4691 125.805 0.00449
Table 4.28: Critical voltage and current values with change in timber resistance (Rtimber)
Results
The following results were observed from the analysis:
• Increasing the line impedance Zp from 40m to 500m had very little impact. As
would be expected, the increased impedance reduced the fault current and mag-
nitude slightly.
• When the resistance of the access permit earths Rap was set at 10Ω, the fault
current was much higher and Vtouch rose to almost 17V. As Rap increased, Vtouch
decreased.
• When the resistance of the permanent earth at the worksite pole RPE was set
at 1Ω, Vtouch rose to a significant level of 125.6V. This is due to a large fault
current of 4575A. Even with this occurring, the calculated current through the
line worker was still at safe levels.
• Varying the bonding point attachment height affected the magnitude of current
through the line worker ILW . Attaching at 6.9m caused 3mA to flow which would
be below the ‘threshold of let-go’. Attaching at 2.4m above ground caused a much
smaller ILW . This is due to the additional timber series impedance between the
line worker and bonding point.
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• At moisture levels of 20%, the lineworker current was negligible. If the pole was
’saturated’ (see Section 3.2.4 the value of Rtimber reduces significantly. The line
worker current ILW reached 4.5mA which would be below the ‘threshold of let-
go’. As explained in Section 3.2.4, a pole exposed to normal climatic conditions
would not reach the saturated state.
The performance of the application technique shown in Figure 2.6 was tested by varying
a number of site parameters. Even with the worst case fault currents and touch voltages,
the result indicate the line worker would have been kept safe. The maximum value of
ILW recorded would have been below the ‘threshold of let-go’ and unlikely to cause any
injury to the worker.
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4.2.4 Bonding application shown in CEOP2377 Figure 4
Analysis
The following analysis is of the bonding technique shown in Figure 2.7. The technique
is similar to that of Figure 2.6 except it applies to conductive poles made of steel or
concrete. On a steel pole, there is no permanent earth cable installed as the pole
itself, being a large conductor, acts as a connection to earth. When earthing and short
circuiting is applied at the pole, a bridge must be made between the pole and temporary
earths in the form of a PPB. CEOP2377 specifies that the bonding point on a steel or
concrete pole be attached at a height of 2.4m
Similar analysis to that used in Section 4.2.3 has been performed on this technique.
The situation under analysis is the same as shown in Figure 4.32. That is, a work
site located just outside the zone substation. Figure 4.35 is the connection diagram
showing the worksite resistive components. This varies slightly to Figure 4.31 with
the absence of a permanent earth cable, permanent earth electrode, and resistive value
Rptpe. Figure 4.36 shows the sequence diagram to determine the maximum fault current
level at the worksite. Only steel poles have been analysed as all surfaces of the pole are
conductive, and more so compared to concrete.
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Figure 4.35: Schematic diagram of personal protective bonding technique shown in Figure
2.7
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Figure 4.36: Sequence diagram used to determine fault current flow
The resistance of a steel pole is an important consideration. Given the much larger
cross section area a steel pole has compared to the earthing cables used, and even
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allowing for the difference in conductivity of steel and copper, it is reasonable to expect
that the resistance of the pole will be less than that of the earth cable. Therefore, a
greater portion of fault current may be drawn through the pole compared to a timber
pole.
The resistance value used for the steel pole analysis has been determined two ways.
Information obtained from Ingal Poles quote the resistivity of steel as being 190 mi-
croOhm.mm (Gillespie 2013). The equivalent cross sectional area of 12.5m 12kN pole
has been calculated using diameter information obtained from Essential Energy’s stan-
dard constructions. A 12.5m 12kN pole is a typical size for a distribution application.
The calculated resistance value was also compared to a resistance measurement taken
from an actual pole located at the Essential Energy Queanbeyan depot. The measured
resistance successfully verified the results calculated below.
The resistance of a steel pole is calculated as follows:
ρ = 190× 10−6Ω.mm
l = 1m
PoleOutsideDiameter = 0.273m
PoleCSA1 = pir
2
OD
PoleCSA1 = 0.05853m
2
Pole InsideDiameter = 0.2634m
PoleCSA2 = pir
2
ID
PoleCSA2 = 0.054490m
2
PoleCSA = PoleCSA1 − PoleCSA1
PoleCSA = 0.00404436m
2
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The formula for resistance is:
Rpole =
ρl
a
(4.77)
The resistance per metre is calculated as follows:
Rpole =
190× 10−6Ω.m× 1m
0.00404436m2
Rpole = 46.9× 10−6Ωm
Figure 4.37 is the simplified circuit used for loop analysis. When the values of current,
I1 to I3, are determined, it is possible to determine the maximum work site current,
and then the prospective touch voltage a line worker may be subjected to. The degree
of safety this bonding technique provides can then be critically assessed.
Figure 4.37: Simplified circuit for loop analysis
To determine the current I1, I2 and I3, a system of equations has been developed as
follows.
(Zn + Zp + 3Rapc + 3Rape)I1 − 3RapcI2 − 3RapeI3 = VS (4.78)
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−3RapcI1 + (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb)I2 − 3RppbI3 = 0 (4.79)
−3RapeI1 − 3RppbI2 + (3Rape + 3Rppb + 3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)I3 = 0 (4.80)
Equations 4.78 to 4.80 can now be represented in Matrix form to allow Matlab to be
used for easy solution. As can be seen in Figure 4.37, current I1 equals the total fault
current flowing as a result of the single line to ground fault occurring. All this current
flows via the worksite. The touch current experienced by a line worker is equal to I2.
The current carried by the PPB is the difference between I2 and I3.

(Zn + ZP −3Rapc −3Rape
+3Rapc + 3Rape)
−3Rapc (3Rapc + 3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb) −3Rppb
−3Rape −3Rppb (3Rape + 3Rppb
−3Rape −3Rppb +3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)


I1
I2
I3
I4
 =

Vs
0
0
0

A Matlab script has been developed to perform the required calculations and allow
experimentation with the input values. A representative Matlab script is included in
Appendix B.
Input values which could realistically change in practice have been varied and the
resulting critical voltage and currents recorded. The results are provided in Tables 4.30
to 4.33. The input values for the calculations are summarised in Table 4.29.
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Input variable Value Unit Notes
Powerline distance 40 m Distance between APE and worksite
ZP 0.000167 +j0.000228 Ω/m Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR)
RAP cable 0.00498 Ω 70mm
2 sq Cu - rated 16kAs
Soil resistivity 100 Ω.m
RAP electrode 206.93 Ω Calculated value
RLW 900 Ω Resistance of lineworker
Pole length 12.5 m Total length
Line worker height 2.2 m Includes reach
Bonding Point Attachment 2.4 m Height above ground
Rsteel 0.0469 mΩ/m CCA pole at 20% moisture
RPA 0.21141 mΩ Pole section between LW and BP
RPB 0.20201 mΩ Pole section below BP
Rpolefooting 46.39 Ω Calculated
RPPB 0.00337 Ω 5m length
Table 4.29: Initial input values for analysis of PPB bonding method of Figure 2.7
Variance of ZP :
Powerline length (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (mA)
Initial - 40m 166.1 166.1 135.7 6300.3 4.462 4.96
100 166.1 166.1 135.7 6299.7 4.461 4.96
250 166.1 166.1 135.7 6298.3 4.460 4.96
500 166.0 166.0 135.6 6296.0 4.459 4.95
Table 4.30: Critical voltage and current values with changes in powerline length (ZP )
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Rho @0.5m RAP IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (mA)
electrode (Ω)
216 446 149.9 149.9 135.8 6305.3 4.071 4.52
300 620 146 146.0 135.8 6306.4 3.977 4.42
468 968 142.4 142.4 135.9 6307.6 3.89 4.32
750 1551 140.0 140.0 135.9 6308.3 3.831 4.26
933 1930 139.2 139.2 135.9 6308.5 3.812 4.24
Table 4.31: Critical voltage and current values with changes in APE electrode resistance
(RAP )
Rho @2.0m Rpolefooting (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (mA)
10 3.71 1589.2 1589.2 1561.1 5837.8 43.56 48.40
25 9.27 688.9 688.9 659.3 6136.5 18.826 20.92
50 18.86 365.8 365.8 335.6 6238.6 9.947 11.05
125 46.39 166.1 166.1 135.7 6300.3 4.462 4.96
200 74.23 115.6 115.6 85.0 6324.4 3.072 3.41
300 111.3 87.3 87.3 56.8 6308.5 2.296 2.55
Table 4.32: Critical voltage and current values with changes in pole footing resistance
(Rpolefooting)
RPPB (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) VBP (V) VTOUCH (V) ILW (mA)
50mm2 Cu 166.1 166.1 135.7 6300.3 4.462 4.96
95mm2 Cu 166.1 166.1 135.7 6300.3 4.175 4.64
Table 4.33: Critical voltage and current values with changes PPB cable size (RPPB)
Results
The following results were observed from the analysis:
• Increasing the line impedance Zp from 40m to 500m mde very little impact.
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As would be expected, the increased impedance reduced the fault current and
magnitude only slightly. With the initial values of Table 4.29, the line worker
experienced nearly 5mA of body current.
• Varying the resistance of the access permit earth electrode Rap had minimal
impact upon the performance of the PPB system. The resistance values used
in testing were calculated from soil resistivity measured in the field. As the
temporary earthing electrode is only installed at a shallow depth, the resistance
is generally high. Consequently, this high resistance impedes the fault current
and limits the risk to the line worker.
• Different values of pole footing resistance Rpolefooting were calculated over a range
of soil resistivity values. Low Rpolefooting values allowed a higher level of fault
current to flow through the worksite. Under the worst case conditions, Rpolefooting
equalled 3.71Ω, the fault level rose to 1589A, Vtouch was 43.56V and the line
worker current 48.4mA. The lineworker current would be close to the ‘threshold
of ventricular fibrillation’ for some people. However, at this relatively low level,
the current would need to be sustained for several seconds according to Figure
20 of AS60479. The fault current level of 1589A should result in the upstream
protection device isolating the fault in well under 1 second. Thus, even though
ILW is of a concerning magnitude, it would be unlikely to cause serious harm to
the line worker.
• Varying the size of the PPB cable had negligible impact upon the results.
Results
The performance of the application technique shown in Figure 2.7 was tested by varying
a number of site parameters. The conductive property of the steel pole resulted in higher
levels of ILW compared with the insulating property of timber. However, even with
the worst case fault currents and touch voltages, the value of ILW was still low enough
to expect line worker would have been safe given the quick operation of the upstream
protection.
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4.2.5 Bonding application shown in CEOP2377 Figure 5
Analysis
This analysis is of the bonding technique shown in Figure 2.8. The technique is used
on steel and concrete poles when APE are applied at the upstream isolation point, and
are in view of the work site. A PPB is applied from the conductor being worked on
to the pole below the workers feet. This application is similar to both Figures 2.4 and
2.5. The conductive properties of the steel pole replicate the existence of a permanent
earth on a timber pole.
This technique was analysed using a similar approach to the techniques of Figures
2.4 to 2.7. The safety of the lineworker was assessed with the worksite subjected
to a worst case network situation. In practice this would occur with a single phase
energisation and, the worksite located as close as possible to the zone substation. In
this circumstance the prospective fault current will be at a maximum. This situation
is shown in Figure 4.38.
Figure 4.38: Worksite set up immediately downstream of zone substation
A connection diagram representing this technique is shown in Figure 4.39. The de-
termination of maximum fault current caused by a single phase energisation of the
worksite, can be determined using the sequence diagram shown in Figure 4.40.
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Figure 4.39: Schematic diagram of personal protective bonding technique shown in Figure
2.8
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Figure 4.40: Sequence diagram used to determine fault current flow
Figure 4.41 the simplified circuit used for loop analysis. When the values of current,
I1 to I3, are determined, it is possible to determine the maximum work site current, as
well as the prospective touch voltage a line worker would be subjected to. From the
figure, it can be seen that the total fault current If equals I1, and the touch voltage
Vtouch equals I3 times Rppb. When the current values are determined, the degree of
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safety this bonding technique affords the line worker can then be critically assessed.
Figure 4.41: Simplified circuit for loop analysis
To determine the current I1, I2, and I3, a system of equations has been developed as
follows.
Let
ZN = X
+
S +X
+
T +X
−
S +X
−
T +X
0
T + 3RZS + 3Rf (4.81)
and
RAP = RAPC +RAPE (4.82)
then
(ZN + 3Rap)I1 − 3RapI2 = VS (4.83)
and
−3RapI1 + (3Rap + ZP + 3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)I2 − (3Rlw + 3Rpa)I3 = 0
(4.84)
−(3Rlw + 3Rpa)I2 + (3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb)I3 = 0 (4.85)
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The Equations 4.83 to 4.85 have been converted to the matrix form. This facilitates
the use of Matlab to solve the equations.

(Zn + 3Rap) −3Rap 0
−3Rap (3Rap + Zp + 3Rlw + 3Rpa −(3Rlw + 3Rpa)
+3Rpb + 3Rpolefooting)
−(3Rlw + 3Rpa) (3Rlw + 3Rpa + 3Rppb)


I1
I2
I3
 =

Vs
0
0

A Matlab script has been developed to perform the required calculations and allow
experimentation with the input values. A representative Matlab script is included in
Appendix B. The initial input values used in the calculations are listed in Table 4.34.
Input values which could realistically change in practice have been varied and the
resulting critical voltage and currents recorded. The calculated results are displayed in
Tables 4.35 to 4.38
Input variable Value Unit Notes
Powerline distance 40 m Distance between APE and worksite
ZP 0.0067 +j0.0091 Ω/m Lemon (30/7/3.00 ACSR)
RAP cable 0.00498 Ω 70mm
2 sq Cu - rated 16kAs
Soil resistivity 100 Ω.m Nominal ‘good soil’ value
RAP electrode 206.9 Ω Calculated on soil resistivity
RLW 900 Ω Resistance of lineworker
Pole length 12.5 m Total length
Line worker height 2.2 m Includes reach
Bonding Point Attachment 2.4 m Height above ground
Rsteel 0.0469 Ω/m CCA pole at 20% moisture
RPA 0.000211 Ω Pole section between LW and BP
RPB 0.000202 Ω Pole section below BP
Rpolefooting 46.4 Ω Estimated
RPPB 0.000696 Ω 5m length
Table 4.34: Initial input values for analysis of PPB bonding method of Figure 2.8
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Variance of ZP :
Powerline length (m) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTouch (V) ILW (A)
Initial - 40m 166.2 135.8 135.8 6300.3 0.319 0.00035
100 166.2 135.8 135.8 6299.8 0.319 0.00035
250 166.2 135.8 135.8 6298.7 0.319 0.00035
500 166.2 135.7 135.7 6296.8 0.3189 0.00035
Table 4.35: Critical voltage and current values with changes in powerline length (ZP )
Rho @2.0m RAP elecrode (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTouch (V) ILW (A)
216 446.9 150 135.90 135.90 6305.3 0.3193 0.00035
300 620.8 146.1 135.92 135.92 6306.5 0.3194 0.00035
468 968.4 142.5 135.95 135.95 6307.5 0.3195 0.00035
750 1551 140.0 135.96 135.96 6308.3 0.3195 0.00036
933 1930 139.2 135.97 135.97 6307.9 0.3195 0.00036
Table 4.36: Critical voltage and current values with changes in APE electrode resistance
(RAP )
RPPB (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTouch (V) ILW (A)
35mm2 Cu 166.2 135.8 135.8 6300.3 0.4576 0.00051
95mm2 Cu 166.2 135.8 135.8 6300.3 0.1711 0.00019
Table 4.37: Critical voltage and current values with changes PPB cable size (RPPB)
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Rho @2.0m Rpolefooting (Ω) IF (A) IWS (A) IPPB (A) Vws (V) VTouch (V) ILW (A)
10 3.71 1591 1562 1562 5834 5.29 0.00585
25 9.3 690 660 660 6135.9 2.22 0.00247
50 18.9 366 336 336 6238.4 1.13 0.00126
125 46.4 166 135.8 135.8 6300.3 0.46 0.00051
200 74.3 116 85.1 85.1 6315.8 0.29 0.00032
300 111.3 87 56.8 56.8 6324.4 0.19 0.00021
Table 4.38: Critical voltage and current values with changes in pole footing resistance
(RAP )
Results
The following results were observed from the analysis:
• Increasing the line impedance Zp from 40m to 500m made a negligible impact.
• The resistance of the access permit earth electrode Rap was relatively very high
compared to the pole footing value Rpolefooting. As such, varying Rap did not
significantly affect the touch voltage Vtouch or line worker current ILW .
• Using a larger cable for the PPB caused a reduction in Vtouch and ILW . However,
both these values were at very low safe levels so there would be no practical
benefit in using a larger cable.
• The value of pole footing resistance Rpolefooting had the greatest influence on
Vtouch and ILW . When Rpolefooting is low, the total fault current flowing is rela-
tively high. This increased fault current resulted in greater voltage drop across
the PPB, and therefore, a higher Vtouch. However, under a worst case condition
where Iws was 1562A, Vtouch had a maximum value 5.3V which is safely below
harmful levels.
The performance of the application technique shown in Figure 2.8 was tested by vary-
ing a number of site parameters. Even with the worst case fault currents and touch
voltages, the result indicate the line worker would be safe. The maximum value of ILW
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recorded would only have been approaching the ‘threshold of let-go’, and therefore,
most probably be at a safe level.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
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5.1 Achievements
My research has demonstrated that current practices in protective bonding and earthing
work well on distribution overhead lines. The combination of ESR requirements and
PPB application techniques ensure potentially lethal currents are diverted around the
line worker. The use of personal protective bonding at the pole where workers are
aloft ensure that equipotential conditions are practically achieved. In the worst case
situations, the touch potentials which a line worker is exposed to are confined below
safe limits.
The placement of short circuits and earths (APE) at each network isolation point
provide an additional layer of protection. Often the APE’s are connected to permanent
earthing installations which provide a lower resistance to the general mass of earth. This
increases the fault current magnitude which in turn causes a faster operation of the
network protection device. Therefore, the duration of an unexpected line energisation
is minimised, and the likelihood of injury to the line worker greatly reduced.
As my research was based upon a specific distribution network in Queanbeyan, the
results do not guarantee that the PPB techniques examined will work in every other
network or geographical location. However, the results do provide useful guidance and
indicate these PPB techniques will be adequate in larger systems with much higher fault
levels. Overall, my research provides reassurance that line workers will be adequately
protected in the event of an unforseen energisation of the power line.
It was anticipated that the analysis may uncover deficiencies in the current practices.
The challenge then would have been to devise practical solutions or improvements.
Depending on the cost of the recommendations, a cost benefit analysis would have been
required to justify the cost of implementation versus the cost of a serious accident. The
research did not uncover any serious problems with current practices. Therefore, the
completion of this project objective was not required.
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5.2 Further work
Due to time constraints, not all possible hazards or work situations were analysed.
Further research and analysis would be beneficial to enhance these findings and to
provide even greater certainty to the effectiveness of current PPB practices.
The techniques and equipment used for underground cable work are unique compared
to those for overhead powerlines. However, underground cable work is subject to many
of the same hazards including accidental energisation and transferred potentials. For
underground work these hazards are just as lethal.
Lightning discharge is potentially the most lethal hazard a line worker may be exposed
to depending upon the magnitude and proximity of the lightning strike. The average
lightning strike is in the order of 30kA (National Weather Service Office of Climate &
Services n.d.). With much larger strikes possible, the safest approach is for workers
to be clear of the powerlines when lightning activity is nearby. Many ENO’s, includ-
ing Essential Energy, have a policy of prudent avoidance where lightning activity is
monitored and work stops when lightning is detected within 10km of the worksite.
The findings from the case study in Section 2.6 demonstrated how PPB was credited for
protecting the line workers when a distant lightning strike occurred. Further analysis
of PPB performance in the event of a ‘direct’ lightning strike close to the work site
would be beneficial. This analysis would determine whether current PPB techniques,
and the equipment in use, will be adequate in the event of a direct strike.
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